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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER, 
FOR INJUNCTION ENJOINING TRANSFERS 
AND FOR OTHER RELIEF 
Plaintiffs C.F. Trust, Inc. and Atlantic Funding Corporation, 
by undersigned counsel, as and for their complaint for declaratory 
judgment declaring Defendants First Flight Limited Partnership, 
Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood Organization, Inc., 
Maryland Air Industries, Inc., PVD Limited Partnership and Occoquan 
Limited Partnership to be alter egos of Defendants Barrie M. 
Peterson and Nancy Peterson, for appointment of a receiver, for 
declaratory judgment determining violations of a charging order of 
this Court, for an order directing the return of payments made in 
violation of such charging order, for an injunction enjoining 




1. Plaintiffs C.F. Trust, Inc. and Atlantic Funding 
Corporation bring this action to collect on lawful, final judgments 
that Plaintiffs have against Defendants Barrie M. Peterson and 
Nancy Peterson. To evade collection, Barrie Peterson, his son 
Scott Peterson, his wife Nancy Peterson and the other Defendants, 
all of which are Peterson-family affiliates, generally have engaged 
in a pattern and practice of false, deceptive, inequitable and 
wrongful conduct to frustrate, hinder, delay, defraud and deny 
recovery to Plaintiffs, legitimate judgment creditors. As more 
fully alleged below, such pattern and practice consists of (i) use 
of affiliates as alter egos and straws for the personal benefit of 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson and to Plaintiffs• detriment; 
(ii) transfers of millions of dollars between and among affiliates, 
and from affiliates to third parties such as personal counsel and 
the holder of the first mortgage on a residence of Barrie and Nancy 
Peterson, in order to benefit the Petersons while shielding the 
funds from lawful recovery by Plaintiffs; (iii) transfers of 
interests in various affiliated entities among themselves for the 
personal benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson and to 
Plaintiffs • detriment; ( iv) transfers of money to and/or for the 
benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson in violation of 
charging orders; {v) bringing groundless lawsuits, and advancing 
groundless positions in lawsuits, against Plaintiffs; and (vi) 
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presenting false and misleading testimony and other information in 
cases against Plaintiffs. By this action, Plaintiffs seek to 
rectify Defendants • wrongful conduct and to make the assets of 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson properly available for . 
satisfaction of the Petersons• judgment obligations to Plaintiffs. 
JURISDICTION 
2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 2 8 U.S. c. § 13 32. 
The matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states. 
This action is brought further pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964 and 28 
U.S.C. § 2201. This Court also has ancillary and supplemental 
jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1367, to 
enforce judgments of this Court in Civil Action Nos. 96-264-A, 96-
265-A and 91-1084 -A (the "Judgment Actions"). This matter involves 
issues directly related to ongoing proceedings in this Court to 
enforce judgments, and to effectuate one or more orders previously 
entered, in the Judgment Actions. 
PARTIES 
3. Plaintiff C. F. Trust, Inc. ( "CF") is a Florida 
corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. CF 
owns two commercial notes dated November 1, 1993 on which 
Defendants Barrie M. Peterson individually, Barrie M. Peterson, 
Trustee, and Nancy Peterson are liable as endorsers and guarantors, 
in the total original principal amount of $6,064,903.57 (the "CF 
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Notes 11 ). CF has and holds judgments against Barrie M. Peterson 
individually, Barrie M. Peterson, Trustee, and Nancy Peterson 
(collectively, the 11 Petersons••) jointly and severally on their 
endorsements of the CF Notes in the total original principal amount 
of $6,117,813 plus interest of 9% per annum (the 11 CF Judgments 11 L 
initially entered by the Circuit Court for Prince William County, 
Virginia on February 1, 1996 and removed to this Court by all 
Defendants, C.F. Trust. Inc. v. Peterson, Civil Action Nos. 96-264-
A and 96-265-A. The CF Judgments are final and unappealable. C.F. 
Trust. Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee v. Peterson, Defendant-Appellant, 
117 F.3d 1413 (4th Cir. 1997). CF also has a Charging Order issued 
by this Court (the 11 CF Charging Order 11 ) dated September 8 I 1998 and 
corrected September 28, 1998, charging the entire partnership 
interests of the Petersons 
Partnership, PVD Limited 
in, inter alia, First Flight Limited 
Partnership and Occoquan Limited 
Partnership with payment of the CF Judgments. Pursuant to the CF 
Charging Order, the Petersons are required 11 to take all available 
steps to cause the Specified Partnerships to comply with their 
duties under this Charging Order ... 
4. Plaintiff Atlantic Funding Corporation ( "AFC") is a 
Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. 
AFC owns a promissory note on which Defendants Barrie M. Peterson 
individually and Barrie M. Peterson Trustee, are liable, in the 





AFC has and holds a judgment against Barrie M. Peterson 
individually and Barrie M. Peterson, Trustee on the AFC Note in the 
total principal amount of $1,217,201.96 plus interest (the "AFC 
Judgment") , entered by the this Court on November 15, 1991 in 
Resolution Trust Corporationv. Peterson, Civil Action No. 91-1084-
A. The AFC Judgment is final and unappealable. AFC also holds two 
charging orders issued by the Circuit Court for Prince William 
County, Virginia (collectively, the "AFC Charging Orders"), one 
dated March 1, 1996 charging the partnership interest of Barrie 
Peterson in First Flight Limited Partnership and one dated March 
15, 1996 charging the partnership interest of Barrie Peterson in 
PVD Limited Partnership with payment of the AFC Judgment. 
5. Defendant Barrie M. Peterson individually and as Trustee 
is an individual residing at 5220 Prestwick Drive, Fairfax, 
Virginia. Barrie Peterson is an obligor on the CF Notes, the AFC 
Note and their predecessors, is an obligor on the CF Judgments and 
the AFC Judgment and is subject to the obligations of the CF 
Charging Order and the AFC Charging Orders. Barrie Peterson wholly 
owns and controls Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood 
Organization, Inc. and Maryland Air Industries, Inc. and presently 
is a 49% limited partner in First Flight Limited Partnership. At 
times previous, Barrie Peterson was a 98% limited partner of First 
Flight Limited Partnership and was the sole shareholder and 
controlling officer of Top Flight Airpark, Inc., the one-time sole 
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general partner of First Flight Limited Partnership owning a 2% 
interest. Barrie Peterson also is a partner in PVD Limited 
Partnership and O~coquan Limited Partnership. Barrie Peterson has 
been the recipient and beneficiary, directly and indirectly, of 
substantial sums of money that are at issue in this suit. 
6. Defendant Nancy A. Peterson is an individual residing at 
5220 Prestwick Drive, Fairfax, Virginia and is the wife of Barrie 
M. Peterson. Mrs. Peterson is an obligor on the CF Notes, is an 
obligor on the CF Judgments and is subject to the obligations of 
the CF Charging Order. Mrs. Peterson owns minor interests in 
various partnerships and trusts otherwise owned and controlled by 
Barrie Peterson and has been the recipient and beneficiary, 
directly and indirectly, of substantial sums of money that are at 
issue in this suit. 
7. Defendant Scott Peterson is the son of Barrie Peterson 
and is an individual residing at 100 Harborview Drive, Suite 1205, 
Baltimore, Maryland. At times material to, and with respect to, 
matters set forth in this Complaint, Scott Peterson resided in 
Virginia and had his principal place of business and conducted 
business in Virginia, at 1376 Old Bridge Road, Woodbridge, 
Virginia. The claims for relief in this complaint arise from Scott 
Peterson's transacting business in Virginia, from his acts and 
omissions in Virginia and from tortious injuries caused in Virginia 
by his acts and omissions in Virginia and elsewhere. Additionally, 
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Scott Peterson's business activities, particularly activities of 
and related to the Defendant entities in this suit, continue to be 
conducted in Virginia at 13649 Office Place, Woodbridge, Virginia 
by Scott Peterson, by others on his behalf and by and through other 
entities including his wholly owned company Upland Holdings Group, 
Inc. and Defendant Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc. 
8. A. Defendant First Flight Limited Partnership ("First 
Flight") is a limited partnership organized under the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia with its principal place of business at 
13649 Office Place, Woodbridge, Virginia. Barrie Peterson 
currently purports to be a 49% limited partner and formerly owned 
or controlled 100% of the partnership interests in First Flight, 
through his wholly owned Top Flight Airpark, Inc. ("Top Flight") as 
sole general partner and Barrie Peterson as sole limited partner. 
B. The purported sole general partner of First Flight is The 
Upland Group, Inc. ("Upland"), a corporation wholly owned and 
controlled by Scott Peterson. Upland received its general 
partnership interest replacing Top Flight as sole general partner. 
On information and belief, Upland did not pay any consideration in 
exchange for the sole general partnership interest in First Flight. 
C. The purported limited partners of First Flight are Barrie 
Peterson and Scott Peterson, each claiming to own a 49% interest. 
Scott Peterson received his limited partnership interest in a 
transfer from Barrie Peterson. On information and belief, Scott 
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Peterson did not pay Barrie Peterson any consideration in exchange· 
for the transfer of the limited partnership interest in First 
Flight. 
9. Defendant Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc. ( 11 BHG 11 ) is a 
corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia with its principal place of business at 13649 Office 
Place, Woodbridge, Virginia. Barrie Peterson is the president and 
sole shareholder of BHG and was so at all material times with 
respect to the events in question in this suit. 
10. Defendant Birchwood Organization, Inc. ( 11 BOI") is a 
corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia with its principal place of business at 13649 Office 
Place, Woodbridge, Virginia. Barrie Peterson is the president and 
sole shareholder of BOI and was so at all material times with 
respect to the events in question in this suit. BOI has no 
employees. 
11. Defendant Maryland Air Industries, Inc. ( 11 Industries .. ) is 
a corporation formed under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
with its principal place of business at 13649 Office Place, 
Woodbridge, Virginia. Barrie Peterson is the president and sole 
shareholder of Industries and was so at all material times with 
respect to the events in question in this suit. 
12. Defendant PVD Limited Partnership ("PVD") is a limited 
partnership organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
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Virginia with its principal place of business at 13649 Office 
Place, Woodbridge, Virginia. Barrie Peterson currently purports to 
be the sole general partner and is a 93% limited partner. Until 
November 19, 1998, Pier One, Inc., a corporation owned and 
controlled by Barrie Peterson, was the sole general partner and as 
of that date purportedly became a 1% limited partner. In or around 
August 1999, Pier One, Inc., owned and controlled by Barrie 
Peterson, purportedly sold its 1% limited partnership interest to 
another entity. Nancy Peterson is a 5% limited partner. 
13. Defendant Occoquan Limited Partnership ("Occoquan") is a 
limited partnership organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia with its principal place of business at 13649 Office 
Place, Hoodbridge, Virginia. Barrie Peterson is an approximately 
39% limited partner, owns approximately the same interest in the 
sole general partner and is personally liable for Occoquan•s first-
trust indebtedness, secured by Occoquan•s principal asset. Until 
August 21, 1996, BOI was the sole general partner of Occoquan. 
14. Defendant Carnett Commercial Investors, Inc. ( 11 Carnett 11 ) 
is a corporation formed under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia with its principal place of business at 13649 Office 
Place, Woodbridge, Virginia. Carnett purports to hold a consent 
judgment against Barrie Peterson individually and as trustee 
entered by the Circuit Court for Prince William County, Virginia on 
July 30, 1993 (the "Carnett Judgment") and further purports to hold 
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a charging order issued out of the Circuit Court for Prince William 
County, Virginia on August 10, 1993 (the "Carnett Charging Order") 
charging the entire partnership interests of Barrie Peterson in, 
inter alia, First Flight and Occoquan with payment of the Carnett 
Judgment. Scott Peterson wholly owns and controls Carnett. 
Carnett's offices and personnel were and continue to be the same as 
the offices and personnel of Barrie Peterson, BHG, BOI, Jubal, 
Inc., J.P. Development,. Inc. and other entities owned and/or 
controlled by Barrie Peterson and/or Scott Peterson. 
15. Doe Entities One through Ten are other entities owned 
and/or controlled by Barrie Peterson and/or Scott Peterson, 
pr-esumably organized under the laws of Virginia and with their 
principal place of business at 13649 Office Place, Woodbridge, 
Virginia and/or 100 Harborview Drive, Suite 1205, Baltimore, 
Maryland. 
Additional Person 
16. An additional entity relevant to this matter, though not 
a def_endant, is DEP, Inc. ("DEP"). DEP is a corporation organized 
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia and has been fully 
liquidated and its assets distributed in bankruptcy, In re DEP, 
Inc., Case No. 95-14438 (Bankr. E.D. Va.). DEP•s principal place 
of business was at 1376 Old Bridge Road and/or 13649 Office Place, 
Woodbridge, Virginia. Barrie Peterson is the president and sole 
shareholder of DEP and was so at all material times with respect to 
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the events in question in this suit from and after approximately 
October 4, 1995. Prior to that date, Scott Peterson was the 
president and sole shareholder of DEP. DEP was the maker of the CF 
Notes endorsed by the Petersons. DEP encumbered three pieces of 
real property that it owned, Dominion Professional Center, Elm Farm 
Mobile Home Park and raw ground known as Pick-A-Pair, with deeds of 
trust as collateral for the CF Notes. Dominion Professional Center 
also was encumbered by a second deed of trust, placed there by 
Barrie Peterson, Trustee, as collateral for the AFC Note. 
FACTS 
Prior Litigation 
17. The Petersons and Scott Peterson have engaged in a 
pattern and practice of treating their purportedly separately owned 
entities interchangeably, of using such entities as Barrie 
Peterson's and Scott Peterson's alter egos, and of other fraudulent 
and improper uses of entities that they own and/or control, to 
frustrate, hinder, delay, defraud and deny recovery to CF and AFC. 
Such pattern and practice include, but are not limited to, the 
incidents and determinations in the following decisions: 
(i} C.F. Trust, Inc. v. Peterson, Civil Action No. 96-1128-A 
(E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 1996) (the "Jubal Decision"). In the Jubal 
Decision, 
Peterson, 
this Court found, in pertinent 
Nancy Peterson and Jubal, Inc. , 
part, that Barrie 
a company owned and 
controlled by Scott Peterson, "told several inconsistent stories to 
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several courts over the past few months, .. ruled that a deed of 
trust that Barrie and Nancy Peterson placed on their residence for 
the benefit of Jubal was, as to CF, a fraudulent and voluntary 
conveyance and voided that deed of trust in favor of CF. 
(ii) C.F. Trust, Inc. v. DEP. Inc. (In re DEP, Inc.), 
Adversary Proceeding No. 97-1017 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 31, 1997), 
aff'd, J.P. Development, Inc. v. C.F. Trust,Inc., Civil Action No. 
98-0079 (E.D. Va. April 3, 1999), aff'd, C.F. Trust, Inc. v. J.P. 
Development, Inc., Case No. 98-1670 (4th Cir. March 5, 1999) (the 
"J.P. Development Decision"). In the J.P. Development Decision, 
the Bankruptcy Court, this Court and the Court of Appeals 
determined, in pertinent part, that (a) J.P. Development, a company 
wholly owned and controlled by Scott Peterson, was 11 Barrie 
Peterson's straw"; (b) the purported purchase by J.P. Development 
of an obligation of Barrie Peterson, secured by a judgment lien on 
Dominion Professional Center, was arranged, orchestrated and funded 
by Barrie Peterson and was for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and 
therefore the purchase extinguished the obligation and attendant 
liens; and (c) CF's superior first deed-of-trust lien on the 
subject property was not extinguished, was not primed by J.P. 
Development • s claimed judgment lien and remained intact. The 
Bankruptcy Court also found as follows: 
To put the matter charitably, truth is not the 
brightest star in Mr. (Barrie] Peterson's constellation 
Nor, it might be added, does the deposition 
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testimony of Scott Peterson assist J.P. Development's 
position. The younger Mr. Peterson • s testimony as to the 
source of the funds used to purchase the judgment is an 
astonishing mass of evasion. It is not often that a 
trier of fact can make a credibility determination based 
on a cold transcript, but in this particular case there 
can be no doubt, based on the deposition transcript, that 
the younger Mr. Peterson had no intention of giving 
straight answers to straight questions or of supplying 
relevant information concerning the transaction. 
(iii) C.F. Trust, Inc. v. Peterson, Civil Action No. 97-2003-A 
(E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 1999), apoeal pending, C.F. Trust, Inc. 
Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jubal, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, Case Nos. 
99-1197, 99-1198 & 99-1199 (consolidated) (4th Cir.) (the "Fortuna 
Decision"). In the Fortuna Decision, this Court determined, in 
pertinent part, that (a) Industries and Maryland Air International 1 
Inc. were the alter egos of both Barrie Peterson and Scott 
Peterson; (b) Scott Peterson used shell corporations, including 
Carnett, Jubal and J.P. Development I for the sole purpose of 
holding Barrie Peterson obligations and obtaining or creating 
priority liens on Barrie Peterson property to create the appearance 
of encumbrances to frustrate legitimate creditors; (c) Barrie 
Peterson • s transfer of a one-half tenancy in common in real 
property known as Fortuna to Scott Peterson was a fraudulent 
conveyance; and (d) Jubal' s purported acquisition of a Barrie 
Peterson obligation and judgment and accompanying deed of trust ·and 
judgment lien encunmering Fortuna <a.different obligation than the 
one in the J.P. Development Decision) was accomplished with money 
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that originally came from Barrie Peterson and was for the benefit 
of Barrie Peterson and therefore the obligation was extinguished. 
The Court also found as follows: 
Barrie Peterson, an acknowledged professional 
litigant, has engaged in a pattern of misstating the 
existence, value, number and nature of his properties, 
other assets, and liabilities in various financial 
documents, legal filings, depositions, and conversations, 
many of these under oath .... 
The Court also found, separately, that a Peterson defense "was 
fabricated for this litigation." 
(iv) Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1998) (the 
"Conspiracy Decision"). In the Conspiracy Decision, the Petersons 
sued CF, an affiliate and an officer, charging tortious 
interference and conspiracy in connection with CF's acquisition of 
the CF Notes from Central Fidelity Bank and CF's obtaining the CF 
Judgments. Both this Court and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit found that the Petersons• accusations of 
tortious interference and conspiracy, and the Petersons• claim for 
damages of $8 million (trebled to $24 million), were groundless and 
that the Petersons were guilty of default. The Fourth Circuit also 
expressly found that the actions of CF and its principal were 
"legitimate," "lawful" and "customary." 
(v) C.F. Trust. Inc. v. Peterson, Chancery No. 38962 (Circ. 
Ct. Prince William County Dec. 2, 1997) (the "DPC Decision"). 
Misconduct by both Barrie Peterson and Scott Peterson that deprived 
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CF of its cash collateral and jeopardized the security for the CF 
Notes, and the threat of future misconduct, caused the Court, on 
CF • s petition, to place Dominion Professional Center in 
receivership. 
(vi) DEP, Inc. v. Jacques (In re DEP, Inc.), Adversary 
Proceeding No. 97-1049 {Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 1997) (the 11 Elm 
Farm Decision 11 ). With respect to the deed of trust encumbering Elm 
Farm Mobile Home Park and Pick-A-Pair, Barrie Peterson, through 
DEP, tried to prevent foreclosure by frivolously alleging that the 
deed of trust was void, even though he, Nancy Peterson and DEP 
repeatedly had agreed and represented that the deed of trust was a 
valid first-lien deed of trust on these two properties. After the 
DEP bankruptcy was converted from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 due 
to Barrie Peterson misconduct, the Chapter 7 trustee determined 
that the Petersons' and OEP's position was meritless and 
acknowledged that CF had a lawful first deed of trust encumbering 
these two DEP properties, and the Court agreed. 
18. As a consequence of the J.P. Development Decision and the 
Fortuna Decision, any liens and charging orders of J.P. Development 
and Jubal arising out of the subject Barrie Peterson obligations 
have been extinguished. 
19. The Jubal Decision, the J.P. Development Decision, the 
Fortuna Decision, the Conspiracy Decision, the DPC Decision and the 
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Elm Farm Decision are binding on Defendants in this suit and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
20. In addition, Barrie Peterson has resisted and frustrated 
AFC's lawful efforts to collect on the AFC Judgment by bringing 
groundless lawsuits and advancing groundless positions in lawsuits 
and presenting false and misleading testimony and other information 
in cases against AFC. For example: 
{i) Peterson v. Atlantic Funding Corporation, Civil Action No. 
96-531-A {E.D. Va.) {11 AFC Decision #1 11 ). In AFC Decision #1, 
Barrie Peterson claimed that the AFC Judgment was not enforceable 
against him because of an alleged prior agreement between Peterson 
and the Resolution Trust Corporation, the former holder of the AFC 
Judgment. The District Court granted AFC's Motion to Dismiss on 
July 19, 1996. 
(ii) DEP, Inc. v. Atlantic Funding Corporation (In re 
DEP, Inc.), Adversary Proceeding, No. 96-1167-SSM (Bankr, E.D. Va.) 
( 11 AFC Decision ft2") . In AFC Decision #2 Barrie Peterson, acting 
through DEP, made claims against AFC virtually identical to the 
claims in AFC Decision ##1. The Bankruptcy Court granted AFC' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment on October 20, 1996. The District 
Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court on appeal on April 4, 1997. 
(iii) Peterson v. Atlantic Funding Corp., Civil Action No. 
96-1476-A (E.D. Va.) ("AFC Decision #t3"). The Complaint contained 
allegations virtually identical to AFC Decision H1 and AFC Decision 
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#2. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of AFC on 
April 27, 1997. 
(iv) Peterson v. Cooley, Chancery No. 41122 (Circ. Ct. Prince 
William Cty., Va.) ("AFC Decision #4 11 ). Barrie Peterson sued AFC 
and an officer, charging tortious interference and conspiracy in 
connection with AFC's acquisition of the AFC Note and AFC Judgment. 
Barrie Peterson nonsuited the action on May 30, 1997 in response to 
AFC's motion to compel discovery. 
(v) Peterson v. FDIC, Civil Action No. 1:97CV00732 (D.D.C.) 
(the "FDIC Decision"). Barrie Pet_erson tried to bring the same 
cause of action as in AFC Decisions #1, #2, and #3 against the 
FDIC. The FDIC's Motion to Dismiss was granted July 7, 1998. 
(vi) Atlantic Funding Corporation v. Peterson, Civil Action 
No. 91-1084 (E.D. va.) ("AFC Judgment Enforcement Action"). In aid 
of execution on the AFC Judgment, AFC sought to obtain possession 
of certain stock certificates owned by Barrie Peterson. Barrie 
Peterson refused to produce certain stock certificates in companies 
that he owned, contrary to an order of this court. As a 
consequence, this Court made a determination of contempt against 
Barrie Peterson, finding that he was "playing games with this 
court" and that his testimony was "incredible. 11 Barrie Peterson 
eventually turned over the stock certificates to purge himself of 
contempt. Peterson subsequently fought unsuccessfully AFC's 
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efforts to obtain discovery regarding the financial circumstances 
of the various corporations. 
(vii) At a judicial sale of the stocks held on September 14, 
1999 pursuant to this Court•s order, Scott Peterson and another 
individual (a friend of Barrie Peterson and Scott Peterson) 
manipulated the bidding process by bidding substantial amounts for 
certain of the stock certificates and by failing to tender the 
amounts of their bids. AFC•s request to set aside the results of 
the judicial sale is pending before this Court. 
21. AFC Decision #l, AFC Decision #2, AFC Decision U3, AFC 
Decision #4, the FDIC Decision and the AFC Judgment Enforcement 
Action are binding on the Defendants in this suit and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
Other Uses of Affiliates to Avoid Payment to CF and AFC 
22. In addition to the facts and circumstances of the 
foregoing decisions, Barrie Peterson, other Defendants and others 
engaged in the following transactions for the benefit of the 
Petersons and for the purpose and with the effect of harming CF and 
AFC. 
Transfers from First Flight Limited Partnership 
23. In the period beginning February 1, 1996, the date on 
which CF obtained the CF Judgments against Barrie and Nancy 
Peterson, through June 30, 1999 (for present purposes, the 
"Judgment Period"), First Flight transferred to BHG in excess of 
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$1,330,000. First Flight had little or no financial obligation to 
BHG for such sums and BHG had little or no right or entitlement to 
such sums from First Flight, whether directly or indirectly. 
24. In the Judgment Period, First Flight transferred to BOI 
in excess of $370, 000. First Flight had no financial obligation to 
BOI for such sums and BOI had no right or entitlement to such sums 
from First Flight, whether directly or indirectly. 
25. Such transfers by First Flight were for the benefit of 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson. 
26. A. In the Judgment Period, when First Flight was 
effecting the foregoing transfers and other transfers to and/or for 
the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson, Barrie Peterson 
was a 98% {96% directly and 2% through a wholly owned corporation) 
and/or 49% (after a purported transfer of 49% to Scott Peterson} 
limited partner in First Flight, and Barrie Peterson received 
little or no direct distributions from First Flight, particularly 
no distributions in 1997, 1998 and 1999. 
B. In contrast to Barrie Peterson, in the Judgment 
Period, Scott Peterson was a 0% and/or 49% limited partner in First 
Flight and received direct distributions from First Flight in the 
aggregate exceeding $3,000,000. 
c. In the Judgment Period and other periods, the First 
Flight partnership agreement required that 11 Cash from Operations 
... shall be distributed 98% to the Limited Partners on a Pro Rata 
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Basis II The foregoing and other First Flight distributions 
violated the First Flight partnership agreement. 
27. In the Judgment Period, during which Scott Peterson was 
receiving over $3,000,000 from First Flight and Barrie Peterson was 
receiving nothing or virtually nothing in direct distributions: 
A. Scott Peterson transferred sums to Nancy Peterson in 
an aggregate amount exceeding $30,000, including transfers by use 
of wires. Scott Peterson had no financial obligation to Nancy 
Peterson and Nancy Peterson had no right or entitlement to any 
money of or from Scott Peterson, whether directly, indirectly 
through First Flight or otherwise. 
B. Scott Peterson transferred sums to BHG in an 
aggregate amount exceeding $500,000. On information and belief, 
Scott Peterson had no financial obligation to BHG and BHG had no 
right or entitlement to any money of or from Scott Peterson, 
whether directly or indirectly. 
28. On information and belief, before, in and after the 
Judgment Period, First Flight may have effected other transfers of 
funds to one or more affiliates of Barrie Peterson, including Scott 
Peterson, and/or to others for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and 
Nancy Peterson. 
29. On information and belief, transfers of money before, in 
and after the Judgment Period from First Flight to Scott Peterson, 
BHG, BOI and other entities owned and/or controlled by Barrie 
: :OilHA\WCIH!.Il\ll':\C:: \ lnlOlO\ 11'!'\'!:.t.H fO. WI'() 21 
A-21 
Peterson, and to others for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and 
Nancy Peterson, had no proper justification or authorization. 
30. On information and belief, such transfers from First 
Flight and such other·transfers as may have occurred, directly or 
indirectly, for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson 
(i) were under the direction and control of Barrie Peterson and 
Scott Peterson; and (ii) enabled Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson 
to wrongfully avoid their lawful obligations to CF and enabled 
Barrie Peterson to wrongfully avoid his lawful obligations to AFC. 
Transfers from Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc. 
31. In the Judgment Period, BHG made substantial transfers of 
sums to Nancy Peterson, BOI, PVO, Occoquan and possibly other 
persons and entities affiliated with, owned and/or controlled by 
Barrie Peterson, for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson, and BHG made other transfers to and/or for the benefit of 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson, including but not limited to 
certain transfers set forth below. 
32. In the Judgment Period, BHG transferred sums, in addition 
to periodic sums in the February 1998-March 1999 period purportedly 
as compensation for employment, in the aggregate equaling or 
exceeding $87,000 directly to Nancy Peterson. BHG had no financial 
obligation to Nancy Peterson and Nancy Peterson had no right or 
entitlement with respect to such sums. 
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33. In the Judgment Period, BHG transferred additional, 
substantial sums to and/or for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and 
Nancy Peterson, including but not limited to substantial sums to 
pay for the Petersons• personal attorneys and legal expenses in 
litigation to prevent CF and AFC, respectively, from collecting on 
the CF Judgments and the AFC Judgment, sums to pay the Petersons• 
personal obligations secured by a first mortgage on their home on 
Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, sums to pay the Petersons' 
personal credit card obligations and sums to pay for the Petersons' 
personal automobiles. BHG had no financial obligation to Barrie 
Peterson and Nancy Peterson with respect to such transfers and 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson had no right or entitlement to 
any money of or from BHG used to fund such transfers, whether 
directly or indirectly. 
34. In the Judgment Period, BHG transferred, generally on a 
monthly basis in substantially similar amounts, sums aggregating in 
excess of $225,000 to PVD. BHG had no financial obligation to PVD 
and PVD had no right or entitlement to any money of or from BHG, 
whether directly or indirectly. PVD used more than $150,000 of 
such sums received from BHG to pay one or more obligations on which 
Barrie Peterson was personally liable. 
35. In the Judgment Period, BHG transferred in excess of 
$84,000 to Occoquan. BHG had no financial obligation to Occoquan 
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and Occoquan had no right or entitlement to any money of or from 
BHG, whether directly or indirectly. 
36. In the Judgment Period, BHG also transferred funds to 
another Barrie Peterson-owned partnership, DG&P Limited 
Partnership. BHG had no financial obligation to DG&P and DG&P had 
no right or entitlement to any money of or from BHG, whether 
directly or indirectly. 
37. On or about November 14, 1997, BHG satisfied a personal 
obligation of Barrie Peterson to James McClure in the original 
principal amount of $100,000, plus interest, and BHG relieved and 
satisfied a pledge by Scott Peterson of certain of his property to 
McClure as security for this personal obligation of Barrie 
Peterson, by making two payments of $93,750 each, one to each of 
two children of McClure. 
38. On or about March 18, 1999, CF served a garnishment 
summons on BHG with respect to the CF Judgments (the "BHG 
Garnishment" ) . From and after the BHG Garnishment, and in 
violation of the BHG Garnishment, BHG transferred substantial sums 
of money to and/or for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson, including but not limited to $15,000 directly to Barrie 
Peterson on or about May 17, 1999. 
39. On information and belief, before, in and after the 
Judgment Period, BHG may have effected other transfers of funds to 
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one or more affiliates of Barrie Peterson and/or to others for the 
benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson. 
40. Transfers to Nancy Peterson, PVD, Occoquan, McClure, 
attorneys, credit card companies, mortgage companies and others 
were for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson and were 
recorded in the books and records of BHG as distributions to Barrie 
Peterson personally. 
41. On information and belief, transfers of money before, in 
and after the Judgment Period from BHG to Nancy Peterson, PVD, 
Occoquan and other entities owned and/or controlled by Barrie 
Peterson, and to others for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and 
Nancy Peterson, had no proper justification or authorization. 
42. On information and belief, transfers from BHG to Nancy 
Peterson, PVD and Occoquan and such other transfers as may have 
occurred, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of Barrie 
Peterson and Nancy Peterson (i) were under the direction and 
control of Barrie Peterson; and (ii) enabled Barrie Peterson and 
Nancy Peterson to wrongfully avoid their lawful obligations to CF 
and enabled Barrie Peterson to wrongfully avoid his lawful 
obligations to AFC. 
Transfers from Birchwood Organization, Inc. 
43. In the Judgment Period, BOI made substantial transfers of 
money to BHG in the aggregate exceeding $230,000. BOI had no 
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financial obligation to BHG and BHG had no right or entitlement to 
any money of or from BOI, whether directly or indirectly. 
44. In the Judgment Period, BOI transferred sums to Nancy 
Peterson of at least $25,000. BOI had no financial obligation to 
Nancy Peterson and Nancy Peterson had no right or entitlement to 
any money of or from BOI, whether directly or indirectly. 
45. On information and belief, before, in and after the 
Judgment Period, BOI transferred additional, substantial sums to 
and/or for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson, 
including but not limited to substantial sums to pay for the 
Petersons' personal attorneys in litigation to prevent CF and AFC, 
respectively, from collecting on the CF Judgments and the AFC 
Judgment. BOI had no financial obligation to Barrie Peterson or 
Nancy Peterson with respect to such transfers and neither Barrie 
Peterson nor Nancy Peterson had any right or entitlement to any 
money of or from BOI used to fund such transfers, whether directly 
or indirectly. 
4 6. On information and belief, transfers of money from BOI to 
Nancy Peterson, BHG and other entities owned and/or controlled by 
Barrie Peterson, and to others for the benefit of Barrie Peterson 
and Nancy Peterson, had no proper justification or authorization. 
47. Transfers to Nancy Peterson, attorneys and others were 
for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson and were 
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recorded in the books and records of BOI as distributions to Barrie 
Peterson personally. 
48. On information and belief, transfers from BOI to Nancy 
Peterson, BHG and others, directly or indirectly, for the benefit 
of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson (i) were under the direction 
and control of Barrie Peterson; and (ii) enabled Barrie Peterson 
and Nancy Peterson to wrongfully avoid their lawful obligations to 
CF and enabled Barrie Peterson to wrongfully avoid his lawful 
obligations to AFC. 
Transfers from Maryland Air Industries, Inc. 
49. In the Judgment Period, Industries transferred to Nancy 
Peterson sums equaling or exceeding $28,000. Industries had no 
financial obligation to Nancy Peterson and Nancy Peterson had no 
right or entitlement to any money of or from Industries, whether 
directly or indirectly. 
SO. In the Judgment Period, Industries transferred to BHG in 
excess of $300,000. Industries had no financial obligation to BHG 
for transfers in that amount and BHG had no right or entitlement to 
monies in such amount of or from Industries, whether directly or 
indirectly. 
51. On information and belief, before, in and after the 
Judgment Period, Industries may have transferred additional sums to 
and/or for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson. 
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52. On information and belief, said transfers of money from 
Industries to ·Nancy Peterson, BHG and possibly to other entities 
owned and/or controlled by Barrie Peterson and others for the 
benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson had no proper 
justification or authorization. 
53. Transfers to Nancy Peterson and others were for the 
benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson and were recorded in 
the books and records of Industries as distributions to Barrie 
Peterson personally. 
54. Said transfers from Industries to Nancy Peterson, BHG and 
possibly others, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of Barrie 
Peterson and Nancy Peterson (i) were under the direction and 
control of Barrie Peterson; and (ii) enabled Barrie Peterson and 
Nancy Peterson to wrongfully avoid their lawful obligations to CF 
and enabled Barrie Peterson to wrongfully avoid his lawful 
obligations to AFC. 
Transfers from Occoquan Limited Partnership 
55. On or about May 6 I 19991 Occoquan made a payment of 
$60,000 to Dashcol Inc. Approximately five days later, on or about 
May 11, 1999, Dashco made a payment of $60,000 to Barrie Peterson. 
56. On or about June 16, 19991 Occ~quan made a payment of 
$901000 to Capital Financial Group, Inc. Approximately six days 
later, on or about June 22, 19991 Capital Financial Group made a 
payment of $90,000 to Barrie Peterson. 
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57. A. On or about July 23, 1999, Occoquan and Barrie 
Peterson, as co-makers, borrowed $400,000 from Dashco to acquire a 
$400,000 cashiers check to post as security for a stay pending 
appeal for the benefit of Barrie Peterson, Scott Peterson and Jubal 
in Civil Action No. 97-2003-A (the "Fortuna Action 11 ). Occoquan was 
not a party to, and was not affected by, the Fortuna Action. 
B. As security for this loan, Occoquan granted a deed 
of trust on its primary asset, Prince William County real property, 
for the benefit of Dashco. 
C. As additional security, two companies wholly owned 
by Scott Peterson, Carnett and B. W. Development, Inc., each 
assigned to Dashco a note made payable by Barrie Peterson. The note 
Carnett assigned was for the original principal amount of 
$1,350,000; and the note 8. W. assigned was for the original 
principal amount of $1,500,000. 
58. A. On or about May 13, 1999, Occoquan transferred 
$30,000 to James McClure, by means of a cashiers check purchased by 
Occoquan, in payment of a personal obligation of Barrie Peterson to 
McClure under a May 4, 1999 Agreement of Sale between Barrie 
Peterson and McClure, pursuant to which Peterson agreed to re-
purchase McClure's one-half tenancy in common in the real property 
known as Fortuna that was the subject of the Fortuna Decision. 
8. Barrie Peterson entered into this Agreement 
purportedly as "Trustee for an entity to be named or his assigns." 
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On information and belief, at the time of this Agreement Peterson 
was not trustee under any agreement for the re-acquisition of the 
tenancy in common in Fortuna that Peterson previously had conveyed 
to McClure·. 
59. In the Judgment Period, Occoquan also transferred 
substantial sums to Carnett for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and 
to the detriment of CF and AFC, including approximately $232,000 in 
the May-July 1999 period at the direction of Barrie and Scott 
Peterson; and Occoquan transferred substantial sums to First 
Flight. 
60. Transfers to Dashco, Capital Financial Group, McClure and 
Carnett were for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and/or Nancy 
Peterson and were recorded in the books and records of Occoquan as 
distributions to Barrie Peterson personally. 
61. Such transfers, directly or indirectly for the benefit of 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson, (i) were without proper purpose 
or proper authorization; and (ii) enabled Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson to wrongfully avoid their lawful obligations to CF and 
enabled Barrie Peterson to wrongfully avoid his lawful obligations 
to AFC. 
62. In the ~oregoing and other transactions, Barrie Peterson 
acted for and on behalf of Occoquan, and Scott Peterson 
participated in the transactions. 
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Transfers from PVD Limited Partnership 
63. According to the sworn testimony of Scott Peterson, 
Jubal, wholly owned by Scott Peterson, received approximately 
$200,000-$250,000 in the aggregate from PVD, purportedly pursuant 
to a charging order that Jubal had against Barrie Peterson • s 
partnership interest in PVD. On information and belief, Jubal had 
no such charging order, Jubal had no other right to such payments 
and PVD had no obligation to Jubal to distribute such funds. 
64. In the Judgment Period, PVD made substantial payments on 
one or more liabilities to third parties for which Barrie Peterson 
was personally liable. 
65. Such transfers, directly or indirectly for the benefit of 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson, (i) were without proper purpose 
or proper authorization; and (ii) enabled Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson to wrongfully avoid their lawful obligations to CF and 
enabled Barrie Peterson to wrongfully avoid his lawful obligations 
to AFC. 
66. In addition to the foregoing transfers, Barrie Peterson 
transferred the 1% general partnership interest from Pier One, Inc. 
to himself and sold Pier One, Inc. •s purported limited partnership 
i~Jterest in the midst of a judgment-enforcement proceeding that AFC 
brought in this Court on the AFC Judgment against, inter slia, the 
stock of Pier One, Inc. Barrie Peterson did so to delay, hinder 




67. On information and belief, before, in and after the 
Judgment Period, Barrie Peterson, Scott Peterson, First Flight, 
Industries, BHG, BOI, Occoquan, PVD and other entities owned and/or 
controlled by Barrie Peterson and/or Scott Peterson, directly or 
indirectly transferred other sums to or for the benefit of Barrie 
P.eterson and/ or Nancy Peterson and said transfers, directly or 
indirectly, (i) were without proper purpose or proper 
authorization; (ii) were under the direction and control of Barrie 
Peterson; and (iii) enabled Barrie Peterson and/or Nancy Peterson 
to wrongfully avoid their lawful obligations to CF and enabled 
Barrie Peterson to wrongfully avoid his lawful obligations to AFC. 
68. Barrie Peterson and Scott Peterson conduct business by 
and through First Flight, Industries, BGH, BOI, PVD, Occoquan and 
other entities that Barrie Peterson and/or Scott Peterson own 
and/or control for Barrie Peterson's and/or Nancy Peterson's 
personal benefit, and Barrie Peterson uses Scott Peterson and these 
entities as his alter egos. 
69. Barrie Peterson purportedly as a "Trustee" conducts 
business by and through various trusts that he owns and/or controls 
for his and/or Nancy Peterson's personal benefit and uses these 
entities as his alter egos. 
70. On or about October 14, 1999, Barrie Peterson brought 
suit in the name of DEP against CF in the Circuit Court of Prince 
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William County, Virginia, styled DEP. Inc. v. C.F. Trust, Inc., 
Chancery No. 46467 (the "DEP Suit"). Having twice failed in his 
own name in prior suits seeking the same or similar relief 
requested in the DEP Suit, Barrie Peterson brought the DEP Suit in 
the name of DEP, using DEP for his own personal benefit and to 
delay, hinder and defraud CF and to deny CF recovery on the CF 
Judgments. At the time of the DEP Suit, DEP had no assets, 
property, operations or income, had been liquidated, and its 
remaining assets distributed to creditors, under an Order of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
dated on or about March 30, 1999 without objection by the Petersons 
or DEP, and DEP could not actually benefit from the DEP Suit. 
71. Barrie Peterson's and Scott Peterson's conduct of 
business by and through the foregoing companies, partnerships and 
trusts for Barrie Peterson • s and/or Nancy Peterson • s personal 
benefit and as Barrie Peterson's alter egos is for the purpose and 
has the effect of (i) hindering, delaying, frustrating and 
defrauding CF and AFC as lawful judgment creditors; (ii) shielding 
and laundering money to evade lawful obligations to CF and AFC; 
(iii) appropriating and committing funds and other assets 
ostensibly owned, transferred or h~ld in the name of Scott Peterson 
and/or the entities to and for Barrie Peterson; (iv) evading lawful 
execution processes; and (v) deceiving governmental authorities, 
including the courts. 
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72. Carnett, which Scott Peterson owns and which purports to 
be a judgment creditor of Barrie Peterson and Barrie Peterson, 
Trustee, knowingly and intentionally authorized, condoned, 
assisted, aided and abetted Barrie Peterson's transfers of funds 
between and among various entities that he owns and/or controls and 
to and/or for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and/or Nancy Peterson 
and to the detriment of CF and AFC; Carnett knowingly and 
intentionally authorized, condoned, assisted, aided and abetted 
Barrie Peterson's conduct of business by and through First Flight, 
Industries, BHG, BOI, Occoquan, PVD and other entities that he owns 
and/or controls for his personal benefit and as his alter egos and 
to the detriment of CF and AFC; and in the acquisition of its 
judgment and charging order against Barrie Peterson, and in its 
receipt of transfers from Occoquan, Carnett acted and continues to 
act at the direction of, with the assent of, on behalf of and for 
the benefit of Barrie Peterson and to the detriment of CF and AFC. 
73. Scott Peterson knowingly and intentionally authorized, 
condoned, assisted, aided and abetted Barrie Peterson's transfers 
of funds between and among various entities that he owns and/or 
controls and to and/or for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and/or 
Nancy Peterson and other conduct to the detriment of CF and AFC; 
and Scott Peterson knowingly and intentionally authorized, 
condoned, assisted, aided and abetted Barrie Peterson's conduct of 
business by and through First Flight, Industries, BHG, BOI, 
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Occoquan, PVD and other entities that he owns and/or controls for 
his personal benefit and as his alter egos and to the detriment of 
CF and AFC. 
74. The foregoing transfers of funds, totaling in the 
millions of dollars, were conducted in and affect interstate 
commerce and were accomplished by and through use of the United 
States mail and United States wires. 
75. On at least four occasions in which CF or AFC sought to 
enforce their respective Judgments, as set forth in the Jubal 
Decision, the J.P. Development Decision, the Fortuna Decision and 
the AFC Judgment Enforcement Action, Barrie Peterson directly 
and/or through entities that he owned and/or controlled corruptly 
endeavored to influence, obstruct and/or impede the due 
administration of justice in the federal courts by and through 
false and/or misleading testimony and other information and/or 
otherwise. 
76. On at least three occasions in which CF sought to enforce 
the CF Judgments, as set forth in the Jubal Decision, the J.P. 
Development Decision and the Fortuna Decision and all occurring in 
Virginia, Scott Peterson directly and/or through entities that he 
owned and/or controlled corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct 
and/or impede the due administration of justice in the federal 
courts by and through false and/or misleading testimony and other 
information and/or otherwise. 
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77. DEP, then owned and operated by Barrie Peterson, filed 
for bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia on October 10, 1995. In the 
Bankruptcy Code preference period prior to the filing, (i) Barrie 
and Scott Peterson misappropriated rents from Elm Farm Mobile Home 
Park and Dominion Professional Center and (ii} Barrie Peterson, 
Scott Peterson and BHG received preferential payments from DEP, 
which Scott Peterson and BHG paid back in part only after being 
sued and which Barrie Peterson failed and refused to pay back in 
any amount. 
78. Notwithstanding the foregoing payments and transfers, 
direct and indirect, of funds to and for the personal benefit of 
Barrie and Nancy Peterson, the Petersons have not reported such 
transfers as income on any federal income tax returns and have not 
paid any income tax thereon. 
79. The foregoing transfers of funds and other acts, in whole 
and/or in part, constitute one or more schemes to delay, hinder and 
defraud CF and AFC, were undertaken with the intent to delay, 
hinder and defraud CF and AFC and in furtherance of such intent, 
and otherwise had the purpose and effect of delaying, hindering and 
• 
defrauding CF and AFC in their efforts to collect on their 
respective Judgments. 
80. The foregoing actions of Defendants, including both 
actions outside of the courts and the multiple court actions, were 
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vexatious, were undertaken in bad faith and were intended to 
multiply proceedings and cause delay, thus frustrating the 
enforcement of legitimate orders of this Court. The actions of 
Defendants constituted an abuse of the judicial process and were 
intended to cause and did cause CF and AFC to incur substantial 
attorneys • fees and costs to enforce their respective judgments and 
to defend against the multiple groundless lawsuits and groundless 
positions advanced by Defendants. The bad faith conduct of 
Defendants should be sanctioned by the Court, pursuant to its 
inherent powers, by requiring Defendants to pay CF and AFC their 
attorneys• fees and costs incurred. The foregoing actions also 
prevented CF and AFC from obtaining sums that should have been 
available for partial satisfaction of the CF Judgments and the AFC 
Judgment. As a consequence, Defendants caused and continue to 
cause CF and AFC actual and substantial harm, compensable by 
damages. 
COUNT ONE 
(Declaratory Judgment of Alter Ego Status) 
81. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragraphs 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
82. This matter is ripe for adjudication. 
83. First F-light, BHG, BOI, Industries, Occoquan, PVD, Scott 
Peterson and other entities owned and/or controlled by Barrie 
Peterson and/or Scott Peterson are Barrie Peterson's alter egos 
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that he uses for the wrongful purposes of secreting his and his 
wife's assets from legitimate creditors, of delaying, hindering and 
defrauding CF and AFC and of evading compliance with lawful federal 
court judgments, federal and state court charging orders and a 
federal court garnishment summons. 
84. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused, and 
continue to cause, CF and AFC actual and substantial harm, and 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson have been unjustly enriched. 
COUNT TWO 
(Injunction Against Asset Transfers) 
85. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragraphs 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
86. This matter is ripe for adjudication. 
87. Defendants wrongfully transferred and continue to 
transfer assets to and for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson for the purposes and with the effects of secreting their 
assets from legitimate creditors, of delaying, hindering and 
defrauding CF and AFC and of evading compliance with lawful federal 
court judgments, federal and state court charging orders and a 
federal court garnishment summons. 
88. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused, and 
continue to cause, CF and AFC actual and substantial harm and 




(Appointment of Receiver) 
89. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragrapps 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
90. Defendants wrongfully transferred and continue to 
transfer assets to and for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson for the purposes and with the effects of secreting their 
assets from legitimate creditors, of delaying, hindering and 
defrauding CF and AFC and of evading compliance with lawful federal 
court judgments, federal and state court charging orders and a 
federal court garnishment summons. 
91. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused, and 
continue to cause, CF and AFC actual and substantial harm, and 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson have been unjustly enriched. 
COUNT FOUR 
(Violation of Charging Orders} 
92. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragraphs 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
93. Defendants wrongfully transferred and continue to 
transfer assets to and for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson for the purpose and with the effect of evading compliance 
with and violating lawful federal and state court charging orders. 
94. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused, and 
continue to cause, C~ and AFC actual and substantial harm, and 




(Violation of Garnishment) 
95. CF incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 
through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
96. Defendants wrongfully transferred and continue to 
transfer assets to and for the benefit of Barrie Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson for the purpose and with the effect of evading compliance 
with and violating the BHG Garnishment, a lawful federal court 
garnishment. 
97. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused, and 
continue to cause, CF actual and substantial harm, and Barrie 
Peterson and Nancy Peterson have been unjustly enriched. 
COUNT SIX 
(Declaratory Judgment Against Carnett Charging Order) 
98. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragraphs 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
99. This matter is ripe for adjudication. 
100. Carnett acquired and holds its liability, judgment and 
charging order against Barrie Peterson, individually and as 
Trustee, for and on behalf of Barrie Peterson. 
101. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused, and 
continue to cause, CF and AFC actual and substantial harm, and 
Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson have been unjustly enriched. 
102. As a further consequence of the foregoing, the liability, 
judgment and charging order against Barrie Peterson, individually 
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and as Trustee, held by Carnett is deemed merged, satisfied, 
extinguished and discharged. 
COUNT SEVEN 
(Statutory Conspiracy) 
103. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragraphs 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
104. Defendants have combined, associated, agreed, mutually 
undertaken and/or concerted together for the purpose of willfully 
and maliciously injuring CF and AFC in their trade, business and/or 
reputation, in violation of Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-499 & 500. 
105. Without limiting the foregoing, Defendants have combined, 
associated, agreed, mutually undertaken and/or concerted together 
for the purpose of willfully and maliciously denying CF and AFC 
their respective rights under the CF Notes, the CF Judgments, the 
CF Charging Order, the AFC Note, the AFC Judgment and the AFC 
Charging Orders, in violation of Va. Code Ann. Sections 18.2-499 & 
500. 
106. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused and 
continue to cause CF and AFC actual, serious harm to their trade 
and business and Defendants wrongfully benefitted from and have 
been unjustly enriched by their misconduct. 
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COUNT EIGHT 
(Common Law Conspiracy) 
107. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragraphs 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
lOS. Defendants have combined, associated, agreed, mutually 
undertaken and/or concerted together for the unlawful purposes of 
(i) denying CF and AFC their respective rights under CF Notes, the 
CF Judgments, the CF Charging Order, the BHG Garnishment, the AFC 
Note, the AFC Judgment and the AFC Charging Orders, (ii) using 
corporate, partnership and trust assets for the personal benefit of 
Barrie and Nancy Peterson and {iv) hindering, delaying and 
defrauding CF and AFC. 
109. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused and 
continue to cause CF and AFC actual, serious harm and Defendants 
wrongfully benefitted from and have been unjustly enriched by their 
misconduct. 
COUNT NINE 
(Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) 
110. CF and AFC incorporate herein by this reference 
paragraphs 1 through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
111. First Flight, BHG, BOI, Industries, PVD and Occoquan, and 
other entities owned and/or controlled by Barrie Peterson and/or 
Scott Peterson, individually are enterprises engaged in, and whose 
activities affect, interstate commerce, and together First Flight, 
BHG, BOI, Industries, PVD and Occoquan and such other entities 
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constitute an enterprise engaged in, and whose activities affect, 
interstate commerce. 
112. Each of Barrie Peterson, Scott Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson, individually, is a person employed by or associated with 
one or more of the foregoing enterprises. 
113. Each of Barrie Peterson, Scott Peterson and Nancy 
Peterson, individually, conducts or participates, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of one or more of the 
foregoing enterprises through a pattern of racketeering activity 
with the purpose and the effect of harming CF and AFC, which 
pattern has been and is continuing and related, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. 
114. The pattern of racketeering activity includes, but is not 
limited to, the following: 
A. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, on at least four 
occasions in which CF or AFC sought to enforce their respective 
Judgments, as set forth in the Jubal Decision, the J.P. Development 
Decision, the Fortuna Decision and the AFC Judgment Enforcement 
Action, Barrie Peterson corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct 
and/or impede the due administration of justice in the federal 
courts by and through false and/or misleading testimony and other 
information. 
B. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, on at least three 
occasions in which CF sought to enforce the CF Judgments, as set 
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forth in the Jubal Decision, the J.P. Development Decision and the 
Fortuna Decision, Scott Peterson directly and/or through entities 
that he owned and/or controlled corruptly endeavored to influence, 
obstruct and/or impede the due administration of justice in the 
federal courts by and through false and/or misleading testimony and 
other information. 
C. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, on at least one 
occasion in which CF sought to obtain discovery in aid of enforcing 
the CF Judgments, as set forth in the deposition of Barrie Peterson 
under oath on February 27, 1998, and possibly on other occasions, 
Barrie Peterson corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct and/or 
impede the due administration of justice in the federal courts by 
and through false and/or misleading testimony and failure to 
produce documents. 
D. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, Defendants devised 
a scheme or artifice to defraud CF and AFC by, inter alia, using 
Scott Peterson and affiliated entities as alter egos of Barrie 
Peterson, transferring substantial sums of money between and among 
such alter egos and paying substantial sums for the personal 
benefit of Barrie and Nancy Peterson by the means and in the manner 
to delay, hinder, prevent and defraud CF and AFC in collection of 
their Judgments; and for the purpose of executing such scheme and 
artifice, and for the purpose of transferring such sums of money, 
Defendants placed and caused to be placed in the post office 
44 
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matters to be delivered by mail and/or private or commercial 
carrier according to the direction thereon, and received from the 
post office matters delivered by mail and/or private or commercial 
carrier according to the direction thereon, including but not 
limited to billings and payments for Barrie Peterson's and Nancy 
Peterson's personal attorneys for legal services rendered for the 
Petersons personally, billings and payments for credit card 
companies for Barrie Peterson • s and Nancy Peterson • s personal 
benefit, billings and payments for the lease of a Mercedes Benz for 
the Petersons• personal use and benefit and billings and payments 
for the mortgage on the Petersons • house in Massachusetts for their 
personal use and benefit. 
E. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Defendants devised 
a scheme or artifice to defraud CF and AFC by, inter alia, using 
Scott Peterson and affiliated entities as alter egos of Barrie 
Peterson, transferring substantial sums of money between and among 
such alter egos and paying substantial sums for the personal 
benefit of Barrie and Nancy Peterson by the means and in the manner 
to delay, hinder, prevent and defraud CF and AFC in collection'of 
their Judgments; and for the purpose of executing such scheme and 
artifice, and for the purpose of transferring such sums of money, 
Defendants caused to be transmitted by means of wire writings and 
other communications in interstate commerce, including but not 
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limited to transfers of funds by wire by Scott Peterson for the 
benefit of Nancy Peterson. 
115. With respect to the foregoing pattern, and particularly 
the violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, Defendants intended 
to induce Plaintiff 1 s reliance and in fact induced Plaintiffs 1 
reliance by and through, inter alia, Defendants' misrepresentations 
and omissions regarding assets available for satisfaction of the CF 
Judgments and the AFC Judgment. 
116. As a consequence of the foregoing, Defendants caused, and 
continue to cause, CF and AFC actual and substantial harm in their 
business and property, and Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson have 
been unjustly enriched. 
COUNT TEN 
(Recovery of CF's Attorneys Fees and Other Costs of Collection) 
117. CF incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 
through 80 above, as if set forth herein in full. 
118. Under the CF Notes, Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson 
. 
are liable to CF for costs and expenses incurred in collection and 
in preserving, perfecting or disposing of any of the collateral, 
including attorneys fees of 25% of the amounts due under the CF 
Notes. The CF Notes provide further that all rights and remedies 
are cumulative and not exclusive and may be exercised successively. 
The CF Notes are still outstanding, no judgment having been sought 
or obtained against the maker, DEP. 
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119. CF has incurred substantial costs and expenses in 
collection and in preserving, perfecting or disposing of any of the 
collateral, including attorneys fees, and has particularly incurred. 
substantial costs and expenses as a consequence of the foregoing 
conduct of Barrie Peterson. 
120. Accordingly, CF is entitled to payment by Barrie Peterson 
and Nancy Peterson of all such costs and expenses, including 
attorneys fees of 25% of the maximum amount due under the CF Notes 
from and after DEP's and the Petersons' defaults thereunder. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs C.F. Trust, Inc. and Atlantic Funding 
Corporation respectfully pray for: 
(1) an order declaring that First Flight Limited Partnership, 
Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood Organization, Inc., PVD 
Limited Partnership, Occoquan Limited Partnership (and, to the 
extent necessary, without compromising the Fortuna Decision, 
Maryland Air Industries, Inc.) , the "entity to be named or his 
assigns" for which Barrie Peterson acquired McClure's interest in 
the Fortuna property, Nancy Peterson and Scott Peterson are the 
alter egos of Barrie Peterson and that the assets of First Flight 
Limited Partnership, Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood 
Organization, Inc., PVD Limited Partnership, Occoquan Limited 
Pa.rtnership, Maryland Air Industries, Inc. and Scott Peterson are 
subject to the CF Judgments and the AFC Judgment and are available 
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for levy, execution and other judgment-enforcement procedures by 
and on behalf of CF and AFC in order to satisfy in full the CF 
Judgments and the AFC Judgment and any additional judgment 
obligations arising out of this suit; 
(2) an order appointing one or more receivers to administer 
the business and affairs of Barrie Peterson, Barrie Peterson, 
Trustee, Nancy Peterson, First Flight Limited Partnership, 
Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood Organization, Inc., PVD 
Limited Partnership, Occoquan Limited Partnership and Maryland Air 
Industries, Inc.; 
(3) an order declaring that any lien or charging order in the 
name of or for the benefit of Carnett Commercial Investors, Inc. 
against any asset or property of Barrie Peterson individually or as 
trustee or Nancy Peterson is extinguished or, in the alternative, 
subordinate to the liens and charging orders of CF and AFC; 
(4) an order directing the return of all monies paid out or 
otherwise transferred in violation of the CF Charging Order, the 
AFC Charging Orders and the BHG Garnishment and the payment of such 
monies to CF and AFC; 
(5) a preliminary injunction or other appropriate relief 
pendente lite prohibiting transfer or disposition of any assets of 
Barrie Peterson, Barrie Peterson, Trustee, and Nancy Peterson, and 
prohibiting transfer or disposition of any assets of, stock of or 
ownership interests in First Flight Limited Partnership, Birchwood 
: :OIIHA\WOAI.OOX\C:: \ 10 IOJO\ I iT\111\L49'10.WI'O 48 
A-48 
Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood Organization, Inc., PVD Limited 
Partnership, Occoquan Limited Partnership and Maryland Air 
Industries, Inc. , except as a transfer of assets may be pursuant to 
an order of this Court, not to or for the benefit of Barrie 
Peterson, Nancy Peterson, Scott Peterson or any affiliate of the 
foregoing individuals or to CF or AFC in order to satisfy in full 
the CF Judgments and the AFC Judgment and any additional judgment 
obligations arising out of this suit; 
(6) a permanent injunction or other appropriate relief 
prohibiting transfer or disposition of any assets of Barrie 
Peterson, Barrie Peterson, ·Trustee, and Nancy Peterson, and 
prohibiting transfer or disposition of any assets of, stock of or 
ownership interests in First Flight Limited Partnership, Birchwood 
Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood Organization, Inc., PVD Limited 
Partnership, Occoquan Limited Partnership and Maryland Air 
Industries, Inc., except as a transfer of assets may be pursuant to 
an order of this Court, not to or for the benefit of Barrie 
Peterson, Nancy Peterson, Scott Peterson or any affiliate of the 
foregoing individuals or to CF or AFC in order to satisfy in full 
the CF Judgments and the AFC Judgment and any additional judgment 
obligations arising out of this suit; 
(7) a constructive trust on the assets and income of First 
Flight Limited Partnership, Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc., 
Birchwood Organization, Inc., Maryland Air Industries, Inc., PVD 
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Limited Partnership, Occoquan Limited Partnership and Scott 
Peterson for the benefit of CF and AFC for the satisfaction of the 
CF Judgments and the AFC Judgment and any additional judgment 
obligations arising out of this suit; 
(8) monetary judgments against First Flight Limited 
Partnership, Birchwood Holdings Group, Inc., Birchwood 
Organization, Inc., Maryland Air Industries, Inc., PVD Limited 
Partnership, Occoquan Limited Partnership and Scott Peterson for 
the aggregate amounts of money that each paid out or received, 
directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of Barrie Peterson 
and/or Nancy Peterson; 
(9) compensatory damages in such amounts as may be warranted 
and proven at trial, including but not limited to attorneys fees 
and other expenses incurred by CF and AFC in connection with 
obtaining, defending and enforcing their respective Judgments and 
in defending against the bad faith actions of the Defendants, 
trebled; 
(10) punitive damages in such amounts as may be warranted and 
proven at trial; 
(11) judgments against Barrie Peterson and Nancy Peterson for 
all costs and expenses incurred by CF in collecting on the CF Notes 
and the CF Judgments and in preserving, perfecting or disposing of 
any of the collateral, including attorneys fees in the amount of 
25% due under the CF Notes; 
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(12) an order directing Defendants to take all necessary and 
appropriate action, including but not limited to filings with 
public authorities, to effect the relief granted in this action; 
(13) costs and expenses of this action, including attorneys 
fees; and 
(14) such other and further relief as may be appropriate. 
C.F. TRUST, INC. 
ATLANTIC FUNDING CORPORATION 
By Their Respective Counsel 
Thomas A. Albert (VSB 30457) 
Birch, Horton, Bittner and Cherot 
1155 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1200 
Washington, DC 20036 
(202) 659-5800 
Counsel for C.F. Trust, Inc. 
R. Schro 
\ 
Bean, Kinney & Korman, PC 
. .2o·oo North 14th Street, Suite 100 
,/Arlington, VA 22201 
(7~3) 525-4000 . 
Counsel for Atlantic Funding Corporation 
: :OIJMA\IoiORI.OOX\Ci: \ IOIOlJ\ lt't'\IIAI.HIO,IoiPil 51 
A-51 
734 111 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES 
make all subsequent filings part of the 
same action.2 In this case we have a 
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory 
Relief filed only days after CAP submitted 
its demand for arbitration to the AAA. 
CAP's complaint sought both injunctive re-
lief relative to and pending the arbitration 
proceedings and outcome, which the state 
court granted. It also sought a declara-
tion that the parties' contractual dispute 
was subject to arbitration. In his order of 
September 3, Judge Breeden declared that 
the parties' dispute was subject to arbitra-
tion. Just as in Hetherington, such was 
tantamount to an order that the parties 
arbitrate their dispute. Furthermore, 
Judge Breeden's injunction was considered 
in effect by the panel of arbitrators, as 
referenced in their Preliminary and final 
Award. While Champion repeats the por-
tion of Judge Breeden's order in which he 
states his doubt that his court had jurisdic-
tion over the matter, Judge Breeden exer-
cised his jurisdiction over the action, and 
never dismissed the case. Judge Bree-
den's views on the scope of his jurisdiction 
do not, in any way, bind this court regard-
ing the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(b). 
(5] Both parties recognize that even a 
case falling under the auspices of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act ("FAA''), 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-16, must meet independent grounds 
for removal jurisdiction. See In re Mercu-
ry Construction Corp., 656 F.2d 933, 938 
(4th Cir.1981). Champion's argument that 
the rules of the FAA apply to this matter 
does not require that the proceeding to 
confirm the award be deemed so separate 
and independent as to allow removal to 
federal court more than thirty days after 
the state court is vested with jurisdiction 
in the initial judicial proceedings. As Con-
gress has seen fit to grant concurrent jur-
isdiction to state courts, the state court 
certainly is capable of deciding whether 
2. The presence of the grounds for removal 
must be unambiguous •• • in the light of the 
defendant's knowledge and the claims made 
in the initial complaint.' " See Bobbin Publi-
cations, Inc., 525 F.Supp. at 246 (citing 
the FAA or the South Carolina Uniform 
Arbitration Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-48-
10 to -240 (Supp.1999), applies to the mat-
ter. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, 
ORDERED, for the foregoing reasons 
that plaintiffs Motion to Remand is 
GRANTED, and Defendant's Motions to 
Stay or in the Alternative to Change the 
Arbitration Award and to Vacate or in the 
Alternative to Modify the Arbitration 
Award are hereby MOOTED. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
C.F. TRUST, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FIRST FLIGHT LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, et al., 
Defendants. 
No. Civ.A. 99-1742-A. 
United States District Court, 
E.D. VIrginia, 
Alexandria Division. 
Aug. 31, 2000. 
Judgment creditors sought to collect 
on judgments they held against individual 
and corporate entities, which were alleged 
to be individual's alter egos. Both parties 
moved for summary judgment. The Dis-
trict Court, Ellis, J., held that: (1) under 
predicted Vll'ginia law, cause of action for 
reverse piercing of the corporate veil 
Mielke, 472 F.Supp. at 853). Champion does 
not claim that CAP's Complaint for Injunctive 
and Declaratory Relief failed to present 
grounds for removal based upon diversity jur· 
isdiction. 
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would be recognized; (2) under Vttginia 
law on piercing corporate veil, plaintiff 
must establish that shareholder has used 
corporation to evade personal obligation, 
to perpetrate fraud or a crime, to commit 
an injustice, or to gain an unfair advan-
tage; (3) fact that most of the counts con-
cerning alleged racketeering violations, 
conspiracy, and violations of charging or 
garnishment orders had been dismissed 
from plaintiffs' complaint did not prohibit 
plaintiffs from proceeding with their at-
tempt to pierce corporate veil; and (4) 
individual could not be the alter ego of 
another individual. 
3. Corporations ~1.4(1) 
In ''insider reverse piercing" actions, a 
dominant shareholder attempts to disre-
gard the corporate form so as to permit 
the insider to raise corporate claims 
against the third party. 
See publication Words and Phras-
es for other judicial constructions 
and definitions. 
4. Corporations ~1.4(1) 
Under predicted Vttginia law, reverse 
piercing cause of action would be recog-
nized, provided that plaintiff can establish 
the requisite grounds. 
Motions granted in part and denied in 5. Corporations ~1.4(1) 
part. Under Virginia law, determination of 
1. Corporations ~1.4(2, 4) 
While Vll""ginia law permits actions to 
disregard separate legal existence of cor-
porations, piercing of the corporate veil 
should be permitted only when necessary 
to promote justice and only under excep-
tional circumstances, such as where corpo-
rate insider has so abused or disregarded 
the corporate form that the corporation 
becomes the alter ego of the insider; in 
these instances, if certain requirements 
are met, corporate veil may be pierced so 
that creditor can reach assets of share-
holder to satisfy obligations of the corpora-
tion. 
2. Corporations ~1.4(1) 
Under Vll""ginia law, in traditional veil-
piercing action, court disregards existence 
of corporate entity so claimant can reach 
the assets of a corporate insider; in con-
trast, in a reverse piercing action, also 
called "outsider reverse piercing," plaintiff 
seeks to reach the assets of a corporation 
to satisfy claims against a corporate insid-
er, and it achieves goals similar to those 
served by traditional piercing actions-
namely, to prevent abuses of corporate or 
partnership structures. 
See publication Words and Phras· 
es for other judicial constructions 
and definitions. 
whether to pierce corporate veil is fact-
specific inquiry into circumstances sur-
rounding corporation, related parties, and 
acts in question. 
6. Corporations ~1.4(2, 4) 
Under Vll""ginia law, piercing corpo-
rate veil is justified when the unity of 
interest and ownership is such that the 
separate personalities of corporation and 
individual no longer exist, and to adhere to 
that separateness would work an injustice. 
7. Corporations ~1.4(2, 3, 4) 
Under Vll""ginia law on piercing corpo-
rate veil, it is not enough that plaintiff 
establish that the individual had control 
over the corporation or that corporate en-
tity was simply the alter ego, alias, stooge, 
or dummy of individuals sought to be 
charged personally; rather, plaintiff must 
establish that shareholder has used corpo-
ration to evade personal obligation, to 
perpetrate fraud or a crime, to commit an 
injustice, or to gain an unfair advantage. 
8. Corporations ~1.4(2, 3) 
Under Vll""ginia law, the "legal wrong" 
requirement for corporate veil piercing is 
correctly understood as a broad category 
that includes using the corporate form to 
(i) evade personal obligations, (ii) perpetu-
ate fraud or a crime, or (iii) commit injus-
tice. 
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9. Corporations <::=>1.4(2, 3) 
Under Vll'ginia law, in order to meet 
requirement for corporate veil piercing 
that requires plaintiff to show the use of 
corporate form to evade personal obli-
gations, perpetuate fraud or a crime, or 
commit injustice, plaintiffs did not have to 
prove a legal wrong in the form of conspir-
acy or racketeering violations to establish 
that various entities were the alter egos of 
individual; instead, plaintiffs could satisfy 
the requirement by showing that transac-
tions in question, which included alleged 
violations of charging or garnishment or-
ders, were undertaken with a wrongful 
purpose or to evade creditors. 
10. Corporations e=>l.4(1) 
Under Virginia law, fact that most of 
the counts concerning alleged racketeering 
violations, conspiracy, and violations of 
charging or garnishment orders had been 
dismissed from plaintiffs' complaint did not 
prohibit plaintiffs from proceeding with 
their attempt to pierce corporate veil, even 
though the alter ego doctrine is not an 
independent cause of action but a means 
for complainant to reach a second corpora-
tion or individual upon a cause of action 
that otherwise would have existed only 
against the first corporation, where plain-
tiffs still had underlying causes of action to 
collect on their various judgments entered 
against the individual. 
11. Judgment e=>l81(15.1) 
Fact issues concerning whether indi-
vidual abused corporate and partnership 
forms so as to perpetrate fraud or crime, 
evade personal obligation, or commit an 
injustice precluded summary judgment on 
issue of whether judgment creditors could 
pierce corporate veil under Virginia law to 
hold individual liable for debts of his al-
leged alter ego entities. 
12. Corporations <::=>1.4(4) 
Partnership <::=>353, 371 
On principle, it is clear that an individ-
ual cannot be the alter ego of another 
individual; the alter ego test was devel-
oped to provide creditors with a means of 
disregarding the corporate or limited part-
nership form when that legal fiction bas 
been abused by corporate insider. 
Thomas Lawrence Albert, Birch, Hor-
ton, Bittner & Cherot, Washington, DC, 
James Robert Schroll, Bean, Kinney & 
Korman, PC, Arlington, VA. for plaintiffs. 
Russell James Gaspar, Cohen Mohr 
LLP, Washington, DC, James Thomas Ba-
con, Allred, Bacon, Halfhill, Landau & 
Young, PC, Fairfax, VA, Robert Jay Zel-
nick, Szabo, Zelnick & Erickson, P.C., 
Woodbridge, VA. Kerr Stewart Evans, Jr., 
Pepper Hamilton LLP, Washington, DC, 
for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
ELLIS, District Judge. 
This action arises out of attempts by the 
plaintiffs to collect on judgments they hold 
against defendant Barrie Peterson. Plain-
tift's, C.F. Trust, Inc. ("CF Trust") and 
Atlantic Funding Corporation ("AFC"), 
have brought suit alleging that defendant 
Barrie Peterson has used various corpora-
tions, partnerships, and individuals as alter 
egos to avoid payment of his obligations 
under the judgments and seeking to pierce 
the corporate veil in reverse to reach the 
assets of these entities. At bar are the 
parties' cross motions for summary judg-
ment, presenting, inter alio, the question 
whether Vll'ginia law recognizes a cause of 
action for reverse piercing of the corporate 
veil, and if so, what standards govern such 
an action. 
I 
Plaintiffs, CF Trust, a Florida corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in 
Florida, and AFC, a Nevada corporation 
with its principal place of business in Flor-
ida, each own commercial notes on which 
defendant Barrie Peterson, individually, 
Barrie Peterson as a trustee, and Nancy 
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Peterson,• are liable as endorsers and 
guarantors.z On the basis of its notes, CF 
Trust has a judgment against these parties 
jointly and severally in the amount of $6.1 
million plus nine percent interest per an-
num, which judgment was initially entered 
in Prince William County Circuit Court on 
February 1, 1996 and later removed to this 
court. On its note, AFC also has a judg-
ment against Banie Peterson, individually 
and as trustee, in the amount of $1.2 mil-
lion plus interest, entered by this Court on 
November 5, 1991.3 In addition to these 
judgments, plaintiffs each hold charging 
orders issued by both this Court and the 
Prince William County Circuit Court 
charging the partnership interests of the 
parties with payment of the judgments. 
Plaintiffs have brought the instant suit to 
declare that the defendants in this suit, 
Maryland Air Industries, First Flight 
Limited Partnership ("First Flight"), 
Birchwood Holding Group {"BHG"), Birch-
1. Nancy Peterson, the wire or Barrie Peter· 
son. is liable only on the CF Trust notes. 
2. Plaintiffs are purchasers, not original hold· 
ers or the commercial notes. They brought 
this suit as co-plaintiffs because the sole 
shareholder or AFC is both the vice-president 
or CF Trust and the sole owner or a corpora· 
tion that is a 25% shareholder or CF Trust. 
3. The commercial notes owned by CF Trust 
are in the original principal amount of 
$6,064,903.57. The promissory note owned 
by AFC is in the total original principal 
amount o£ S I million. 
4. See C.F. Trust v. Peterson, Civil Action No. 
96-1128-A (E.D Va. Dec. 9, 1996) (voiding as 
a fraudulent conveyance a deed of trust Bar-
rie and Nancy Peterson placed on their resi· 
dence); C.F. Trust, Inc. v. DEP, Inc., Adver· 
sary Proceeding No. 97-1017 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 
Oct. 31, 1997), affd sub nom. J.P. Develop-
ment, Inc. v. C.F. Trust, Inc .. Civil Action No. 
98-0079 (E.D.Va. April 3. 1999), affd sub 
nom. C.F. Trust, Inc. v. J.P. Development, 
Inc •• Case No. 98-1670, 1999 WL 114485 (4th 
Cir. March 5, 1999) (finding J.P. Develop· 
ment. a corporation wholly owned and con· 
trolled by Scott Peterson, to be Barrie Peter· 
son's alter ego); C.F. Trust, Inc. v. Peterson, 
Civil Action No. 97-2003-A (E.D.Va. Jan. 8, 
1999), appeal pending sub nom. C.F. Trust, 
Inc. v. Jubal, Inc., Case Nos. 99-1197, 99-
wood Organizations, Inc. ("BOI"), Nancy 
Peterson and Scott Peterson-various cor-
porations, partnerships, and individuals 
plaintiffs allege Banie Peterson owns or 
substantially controls-are his alter egos, 
and that through these entities, he has 
hindered and evaded the collections of 
these lawful judgments. 
This case is by no means the first suit 
by the plaintiffs claiming that Banie Pe-
terson has taken steps to evade the pay-
ment of these judgments and to defraud 
his creditors. To the contrary, this case is 
merely the latest chapter in an ongoing 
saga. So voluminous is the litigation in-
volving these parties that only a summary 
is presented in the margin.4 
In the instant suit, filed in November 
1999, plaintiffs initially stated claims for: 
(i) a declaratory judgment that First 
Flight, BHG, BOI, PVD Limited Partner-
1198, 99-1199 (consolidated) (4th Cir.l999) 
(finding (a) that Maryland Air Industries and 
Maryland Air International were the alter 
egos or both Barrie and Scott Peterson, (b) 
that Scott Peterson used shell corporations to 
create appearance of encumbrances to frus. 
trate legitimate creditors, and (c) that transfer 
or property to Scott Peterson was void as a 
fraudulent conveyance); Peterson v. Cooley, 
142 F.3d 181 (4th Cir.l998) (upholding the 
actions of CF Trust in acquiring notes and 
judgments against defendants); DEP, Inc. v. 
Jacques, Adversary Proceeding No. 97-1049 
(Bankr.E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 1997) (declaring 
that CF Trust had a lawful first deed or trust 
encumbering two DEP properties); Peterson 
v. Atlantic Funding Corp., Civil Action No. 96-
531-A (E.D.Va.l996) (dismissing Barrie Pe-
terson's claim that AFC judgment was not 
enrorceable against him); DEP, Inc. v. Atlan-
tic Funding Corp., Adversary Proceeding, No. 
96-1167-SSM (Bankr.E.D.Va.1996); Peterson 
v. Atlantic Funding Corp., Civil Action No. 96-
1476-A (E.D.Va.l996) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of Atlantic Funding); Peter· 
son v. Cooley, Chancery No. 41122 (Circ.Ct. 
Prince William Cty., Va.) (suit by Barrie Pe-
terson against AFC and one of its officers 
alleging tortious interference and conspiracy 
in connection with acquisition or the Note 
and Judgment): Atlantic Funding Corp. v. Pe· 
terson, Civil Action No. 91-1084 (E.D.Va. 
1991) (finding or contempt against Barrie Pe· 
terson Cor railure to produce stock certifi· 
cates). 
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ship, Maryland Air Industries, Occoquan 
Limited Partnership, Scott Peterson, Nan-
cy Peterson, and other entities owned by 
Barrie or Seott Peterson are Barrie Peter-
son's alter egos; (ii) an injunction against 
asset transfers; (iii) an appointment of a 
receiver; (iv) violations of eharging orders; 
(v) violation of a garnishment order; (vi) a 
deelaratory judgment that the Carnett 
eharging order issued against Barrie Pe-
terson is extinguished; (vii) conspiracy to 
injure plaintiffs in their trade or business 
in violation of Va.Code § 18.2-499 & 500; 
(viii) common law conspiraey; (ix) RICO 
violations; and (x) costs and attorneys' 
fees. Many of the parties and claims have 
been dismissed either by order of this 
Court or voluntarily by the parties. At 
this time, the only remaining claims are 
Counts I (a declaratory judgment that 
First Flight, BHG, BOI, Maryland Air In-
dustries, Nancy Peterson, Scott Peterson, 
and other entities owned by Barrie or 
Scott Peterson are Barrie Peterson's alter 
egos), II (an injunction against asset 
transfers), and III (an appointment of a 
receiver).5 The only remaining parties are 
Barrie Peterson, Scott Peterson, Nancy 
5. By Order dated March 31, 2000, this 
Court dismissed the RICO count. See C.F. 
Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership., 
Order, C.A. No. 99-1742-A (March 31, 
2000). furthennore, on June 23, 2000, this 
Court accepted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss 
voluntarily Counts IV, VI. VII, VIII, and X. 
and defendants Occoquan and Carnett pur-
suant to Rule 4l(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. See C.F. 
Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership .. 
Order, C.A. No. 99-1742-A (June 23, 2000). 
According to the parties' memoranda, plain· 
tiffs accepted a S 1 5,000 offer of judgment 
from Birchwood Holdings Group on Count 
V of the complaint (violation of a garnish· 
ment order). 
6. By Order dated March 31, 2000, this Court 
dismissed PVD Limited Partnership, a Florida 
corporation, in order to maintain diversity 
jurisdiction. See C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First 
Flight Ltd. Partnership., Order, C.A. No. 99-
1742-A (March 31, 2000). Furthennore, by 
Order dated August 25, 2000, this Court dis-
missed BHG and BOI for lack of controversy. 
See C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partner· 
Peterson, First Flight Limited Partner-
ship, and Maryland Air Industries.6 
At all relevant times, Barrie Peterson, a 
VIrginia citizen, wholly owned and eon-
trolled defendants BHG, BOI, and Mary-
land Air Industries and is a 49% limited 
partner, along with his son Seott Peter-
son, in defendant First Flighl7 First 
Flight is a limited partnership organized 
under the laws of VU"ginia with its princi-
pal plaee of business in Woodbridge, VIr-
ginia. The general partner of First Flight 
is a corporation wholly owned by defen-
dant Scott Peterson, the Upland Group. 
BHG 8 and BOI 9 are both corporations 
organized under the laws of VIrginia with 
their principal place of business in Wood-
bridge, VIrginia. Maryland Air Industries 
is a eorporation organized under the laws 
of VIrginia with its principal place of busi-
ness in Woodbridge, Virginia. 
Plaintiffs allege that, during and after 
the initial judgment was entered, defen-
dants engaged in numerous transactions 
among themselves, and transferred funds 
among themselves, for the purpose of 
avoiding Barrie Peterson's obligations to 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also allege that Barrie 
and Scott Peterson conduct business 
ship., Order. C.A. No. 99-1742-A (August 25, 
2000). 
7. By Order dated June 19, 2000, plaintiff AFC 
became the sole owner of the stock of BHG 
and BOI. See Atlantic Funding Corp. v. Peter-
son, Order, C.A. No. 91-1084-A (June 19, 
2000). AFC bought the stock at auction pur-
suant to a judicial sale order. As a result, 
defendant Barrie Peterson has lost ownership 
and control of these entities. Because of this 
loss of control, defendants moved for partial 
summary judgment on behalf of BHG and 
BOI due to a lack of controversy remaining 
between the plaintiffs and these parties. 
8. BHG provides administrative and manage· 
ment services, primarily, to other Barrie Pe-
terson controlled entities. BHG derives reve-
nue from fees charged for these services at 
the rate of cost plus ten percent. 
9. 801 provides lease and property manage-
ment services almost exclusively to the First 
Flight. BOI charges a four percent fee for 
this service. 
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through First Flight, Maryland Air Indus-
tries, and other entities that Barrie or 
Scott Peterson own and use for Barrie and 
Nancy Peterson's personal benefit, and 
that Barrie Peterson uses these entities as 
his alter ego. For instance, plaintiffs ar-
gue that First Flight, in violation of the 
First Flight partnership agreement, trans-
ferred over four million dollars to Scott 
Peterson. Plaintiffs argue that the gener-
al partner, the Upland Group, did not au-
thorize the distribution and that, under the 
partnership agreement, distributions are 
to be made to limited partners on a pro-
rata basis. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue 
that approximately half of this amount 
should have been paid to Barrie Peterson 
and thus subject to collection by plaintiffs 
as judgment-creditors. Further, plaintiffs 
allege (i) that Barrie Peterson caused mon-
ey to be funneled from First Flight, BOI, 
and Maryland Air Industries to BHG 
above and beyond any reasonable fees 
charged for their services, (ii) that these 
payments were without any corporate or 
business purpose, and (iii) that these funds 
were used to pay the personal expenses of 
Barrie Peterson and his famlly.l0 Barrie 
and Scott Peterson's conduct of business 
through these entities, according to plain-
tiffs, is for the purposes of frustrating 
plaintiffs' attempts to collect their judg-
ments, evading lawful executions process-
es, and deceiving government entities. 
n 
On a motion for summary judgment, the 
moving party must demonstrate that 
"there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The facts themselves, 
and the inferences to be drawn from those 
facts, must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. See 
Ross v. Communications SateUite Corp., 
759 F .2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985). Sum-
10. For example, plaintiffs allege that BHG 
paid Barrie Peterson's personal mongage ob-
ligation on a residence in Nantucket, his cred· 
mary judgment is appropriate when a par-
ty "fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element es-
sential to that party's case, and on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial." Celote:t; Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
(1986). The opposing party must do more 
than "simply show that there is some me-
taphysical doubt as to the material facts." 
Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd., v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 
S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). More-
over, "the mere existence of some alleged 
factual dispute between the parties will not 
defeat an othernise properly supported 
motion for summary judgment." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1986). In addition, in a case in which the 
nonmoving party bears the burden of proof 
at trial, as in this case, "Rule 56(e) re-
quires the nonmoving party to go beyond 
the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, 
or by the 'depositions, answers to interrog-
atories, and admissions on file,' designate 
'specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 
324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56). 
III 
The threshold question raised by the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judg-
ment is whether V1rginia law permits cred-
itors to pierce the corporate veil in re-
verse--that is, whether a person with a 
claim against a corporate insider or limited 
partner can "attempt to have the insider 
and the corporate entity treated as a sin-
gle person." Gregory S. Crespi, The Re-
verse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appro-
priate Stando:rd8, 16 J.Corp.L. 33, 36 
(1990). Defendants assert that Virginia 
does not recognize reverse piercing of the 
corporate veil, and that even if it did, the 
plaintiffs have failed to establish that Bar-
it card expenses, his health insurance, and his 
expenses at a country club. 
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rie Peterson has used the corporations, 
limited partnerships, and individuals as his 
alter egos. 
1. Vityinia Law Permits Reverse 
Piercing of the Corporate Veil 
[1] The "independent legal existence of 
the corporation is a basic component of 
corporate law." O'Hazza v. Executive 
Credit Corp., 246 Va. 111, 114, 431 S.E.2d 
318, 320-21 (1993). While V1rginia law 
pennits actions to disregard this separate 
legal existence, settled precedent cautions 
courts that piercing of the corporate veil 
should be pennitted "only when necessary 
to promote justice" and only under excep-
tional circumstances. Cheatle v. Rwld's 
Swimming Pool Supply Co., Inc., 234 Va. 
207, 212, 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987); see 
also Perpet:uol Real Estate Serv., Inc. v. 
Michaelson Properl,ies, Inc., 974 F .2d 545, 
547-48 (4th Cir.1992). These circum-
stances exist where the corporate insider 
has so abused or disregarded the corpo-
rate form 11 that the corporation becomes 
the alter ego of the insider. In these 
instances, it is settled that if certain re-
quirements are met, the corporate veil 
may be pierced so that the creditor can 
reach the assets of a shareholder to satisfy 
11. Although discussion of the alter ego doc-
trine typically focuses on the corporate form, 
it is settled that the doctrine also applies to 
limited partnerships. See, e.g., Sloan v. 
Thornton, 249 Va. 492, 457 S.E.2d 60 (1995}; 
FO% v. FO%, 1998 WL 114010 (Va.App.1998}; 
Freezer v. Miller, 163 Va. 180, 199, 182 S.E. 
250 (1934). Nor is defendants' contention to 
the contrary persuasive, as the limited part-
nership merely creates a veil capable of being 
pierced under appropriate circumstances. 
12. Outsider reverse piercing actions must be 
distinguished from '"insider reverse piercing" 
actions which are not the subject matter of 
the instant suit. In an insider reverse pierc-
ing claim, a dominant shareholder attempts 
to disregard the corporate fonn so as to per-
mit the insider to raise corporate claims 
against the third pany. See Cargill v. Hedge, 
375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn.1985); Crespi. The 
Reverse Pierce Doctrine, Applying Appropriate 
Standards, 16 J.Corp.L. 33, 37 (1990). Be-
the obligations of the corporation. See 
Cheatle, 234 Va. at 212-13, 360 S.E.2d 828. 
[2, 3] This case raises a variant of the 
traditional veil-piercing case. In a tradi-
tional veil-piercing action, a cotll"t disre-
gards the existence of the corporate entity 
so a claimant can reach the assets of a 
corporate insider. In a reverse piercing 
action, however, the plaintiff seeks to 
reach the assets of a corporation to satisfy 
claims against a corporate insider. See, 
e.g., In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 100 (3d 
Cir.1999). This action, sometimes referred 
to as "outsider reverse piercing," 1% 
achieves goals similar to those served by 
traditional piercing actions-namely, to 
prevent abuses of corporate or partnership 
structures. 
Although relatively new, reverse pierc-
ing actions have gradually gained accep-
tance throughout the country,l3 While the 
Supreme Cotll"t of V1rginia has not yet 
addressed this issue. Vu-ginia may be 
said, nonetheless, to have joined this move. 
ment given that the VJrginia CotJrt of Ap-
peals has recognized the outsider reverse 
piercing cause of action. See Fox v. Foz., 
1998 WL 114010 (Va.App.1998); McLeskey 
v. Davis Boat Works, Inc., No. 9~1113, 
2000 WL 1008793 (4th Cir. July 21, 2000). 
In Fox, a husband, seeking to avoid his 
obligations under a divorce decree, was 
cause the plaintiffs in this case are outside 
creditors attempting to pierce the corporate 
veil in reverse, the body of law related to 
insider piercing cases is inapposite. 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Scherping, 187 
F.3d 796 (8th Cir.1999); McCall Stock Farms, 
Inc. v. United States, 14 F.3d 1562 (Fed.Cir. 
1993); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 
413 (5th Cir.1980); Valley Fin., Inc. v. United 
States, 629 F.2d 162 (D.C.Cir.1980); Olympic 
Capital Corp. v. Newman, 276 F.Supp. 646 
(C.D.Cal.1967); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Ethridge, 159 F.Supp. 693 (D.Colo.1958); Zis-
blatt v. Zisblatt, 693 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.App. 
1985); Central Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Wag-
ener, 183 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 1971); Divctr 
Wayne Sales Fin. Corp. v. Martin Vehicle 
Sales. Inc., 45 III.App.2d 192, 195 N.E.2d 287 
(1963); Platts, Inc. v. Pl4tts, 49 Wash.2d 203, 
298 P.2d 1107 (1956); Central Fibre Prods. 
Co. v. Lorenz. 246 Iowa 384, 66 N.W.2d 30 
(Iowa 1954}. 
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held to have abused the legal fonn of his 
partnerships and corporations and treated 
them as his alter egos. See id. at *8.14 On 
these facts, the V1rginia Court of Appeals 
approved the piercing of the veil of "limit-
ed partnerships, trusts and corporations" 
so as to pennit the spouse to reach the 
assets of each of these entities to satisfy 
the terms of a divorce decree. I d. 
[ 4] The conclusion that Virginia law 
recognizes reverse piercing is not based 
solely on the Court of Appeals decision in 
Foz;IS it finds further finn support in 
principle. Simply put, the rationale for 
traditional piercing operates with equal 
force in support of reverse piercing. The 
fiction of the separate legal existence of a 
corporation is recognized for the purpose 
of encouraging and enabling economic 
growth. When this Conn is abused, courts, 
in appropriate circumstances, may disre-
gard the fiction. And, in these circum-
stances, this should be so, on principle, 
whether the fiction is misused to shield the 
owner's assets from claims against the cor-
poration or to shield the corporation's as-
sets from claims against the owner. Were 
this not the case, an individual could abuse 
the corporate or limited partnership fonns 
14. In reaching this conclusion, the Fox court 
relied on established Virginia precedent eluci· 
dating the standard for the determination of 
the alter ego test. See Fox, 1998 WL at •7-8. 
IS. Worth noting is that plaintiffs contend that 
Fox is not the sole decision indicating that 
Virginia law recognizes reverse piercing: they 
also cite two Eastern District of Virginia 
Bankruptcy decisions to support their reverse 
piercing claim. See In re Wilson, 90 B.R. 208 
(Bankr.E.D.Va.l988); In re Richels, 163 B.R. 
760 (Bankr.E.D.Va.l994). In re Wilson is in· 
apposite as it involves insider reverse pierc· 
ing. See supra note 4. In re Richels is a more 
difficult case because it has characteristics of 
both insider and outsider piercing. The 
plaintiff, in that case, was both an insider-
trustee standing in the shoes of the debtor-
and an outsider-trustee acting as creditor. 
See In re Richels, 163 B.R. at 763-64. To the 
extent that the trustee was viewed as an out· 
sider, akin to a creditor, this decision. then. 
along with Fox, provides precedential support 
for Virginia's allowance of outsider reverse 
piercing actions. 
with impunity so as to evade personal obli-
gations and to hinder the collection of valid 
judgments. Commentators agree that re-
verse piercing, like traditional piercing, 
does not impair the legitimate commercial 
use of the corporate fiction. See, e.g., Ste-
phen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate 
Veil § 1.06 (1993); Crespi, The Reverse 
Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate 
Standards, 16 J.Corp.L. 33 (1990).16 Ac-
cordingly, it is likely that the Supreme 
Court of V1rginia would recognize a re-
verse piercing cause of action, provided 
that the plaintiff can establish the requisite 
grounds.17 
2. The Standard to Pierce the Corpo-
rate Veil 
[5-7] The standard for piercing the 
corporate veil, either to reach the individu-
al through the corporation or the reverse, 
has occasioned much litigation, perhaps be-
cause, as the Supreme Court of Virginia 
has stated, "no single rule or criterion ... 
can be applied to determine whether pierc-
ing the corporate veil is justified." O'Haz-
za, 246 Va. at 115, 431 S.E.2d 318. What 
is clear is that the veil-piercing determina-
16. The only exception to this rule Is that if a 
corporation has multiple shareholders, the 
prejudice to these other shareholders is great· 
er under reverse piercing, because they, as 
non-culpable parties, will suffer for the ac-
tions of another shareholder. Because Barrie 
Peterson owns virtually all of the stock or 
partnership interests in these entities, this 
concern is not present in this case. 
17. Plaintiffs actually assert that First Flight 
and Maryland Air Industries are the alter egos 
of BHG, its affiliate corporation, which, in 
tum, is the alter ego of Barrie Peterson. Vir-
ginia has long held that entities can be the 
alter egos of its subsidiaries or its affiliates. 
See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 
966 F.2d 820 (4th Cir.l992); In re Richels, 
163 B.R. 760 (Bankr.E.D.Va.l994); Lewis 
Trucking Corp. v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 23, 
31, 147 S.E.2d 747, 753-54 (1966) ("'Where a 
corporation is so organized and controlled as 
to become the mere agent or instrumentality 
of another corporation, the courts have laid 
down the rule that the doctrine of corporate 
separateness may be ignored."). 
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tion is a fact-specific inquiry into the cir-
cumstances surrounding the corporation, 
the related parties, and the acts in ques-
tion. It is also clear that piercing the 
corporate veil is justified when the "unity 
of interest and ownership is such that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist and to 
adhere to that separateness would work an 
injustice." /d. It is not enough, however, 
that the plaintiff establish that the individ-
ual had control over the corporation or 
that "the corporate entity was [simply] the 
alter ego, alias, stooge, or dummy of the 
individuals sought to be charged personal-
ly." Ch£atle, 234 Va. at 212, 360 S.E.2d 
828; see also Perpetual, 974 F .2d at 548-
49. In addition, the plaintiff must estab-
lish that the shareholder has "used the 
corporation to evade a personal obligatimz, 
to perpetrate fraud or a crime, to commit 
an injustice, or to gain an unfair advan-
tage .... " O'Hazza, 246 Va. at 115, 431 
S.E.2d 318 (emphasis added). 
Defendants, however, argue for a differ-
ent phrasing of the alter ego test, which 
they contend the plaintiffs cannot meet. 
Specifically, defendants contend that the 
phrase "evade personal obligations," in-
cluded for the fll'St time in the O'Hazza 
decision, is not a part of the alter ego 
standard. O'Hazza, they argue, was an 
aberration because a subsequent 1994 Su-
preme Court of Vll'ginia decision did not 
include this language. See RF & P Corp. 
v. Little, 247 Va. 309, 440 S.E.2d 908 
(1994). Defendants further contend that 
inclusion of the phrase "evade personal 
obligations" is inconsistent with the strin-
gent alter ego standard set forth in Per-
petual, which requires proof of a ''legal 
wrong." 974 F .2d at 549. Relying upon 
this "legal wrong" requirement, they argue 
that plaintiffs cannot prevail, as the only 
counts relating to ''legal wrongs"-namely 
conspiracy and violations of RICO, gar-
nishment and charging orders-have been 
dismissed. 
Defendants' argument fails for two rea-
sons. First, in Greenberg v. Common-
wealth, the Supreme Court of Vll'ginia in 
1998 restated the O'Hazza formulation of 
the alter ego test, complete with the 
phrase "evade personal obligations." 255 
Va. 594, 604, 499 S.E.2d 266, 272 (1998). 
Nor can it be said that the O'Hozza and 
Greenberg formulations are abelTations; in 
Ch£atle, an oft-cited leading case on the 
piercing standard, the Supreme Court of 
VU'ginia used the phrase "avoid personal 
liability," which is essentially indistinguish-
able from the "O'Hazza-Greenberg" 
phrase. Compare Cheatle, 234 Va. at 213, 
360 S.E.2d 828, with O'Hazza, 246 Va. at 
115, 431 S.E.2d 318. Thus, defendants' 
reliance on the absence of the phrase in 
the O'Hazza decision is unpersuasive. 
[8, 9] Second, defendants misread Per-
petual. The "legal wrong" requirement is 
correctly understood as a broad category 
that includes using the corporate form to 
(i) evade personal obligations, (ii) perpetu-
ate fraud or a crime, or (iii) commit injus-
tice. Thus, plaintiffs do not have to prove 
a legal wrong in the form of conspiracy or 
RICO violations in order to establish that 
the various entities are the alter egos of 
Barrie Peterson; instead, what is required 
is that the facts and circumstances estab-
lish one of the factors set forth in the 
Ch£atle-O'HazzarGreenberg line of cases. 
By showing that the transactions in ques-
tion, which include alleged violations of 
charging or garnishment orders, were un-
dertaken with a wrongful purpose or to 
evade creditors, plaintiffs may satisfy the 
"legal wrong" requirement in Perpetual 
and the factors in Cheatk and O'Hazza. 
[10] Furthermore, relying on their 
mistaken view of the "legal wrong'' re-
quirement, defendants argue that dis-
missal of the majority of the counts from 
the complaint prohibits the plaintiffs from 
proving an alter ego claim because no 
underlying cause of action exists. This 
argument, too, fails. To be sure, the de-
fendants are correct that the alter ego 
doctrine is not an independent cause of 
action, but rather is a "means for a com-
plainant to reach a second corporation or 
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individual upon a cause of action that 
otherwise would have existed only against 
the first corporation." 18 Yet, this point 
is not dispositive here, as plaintiffs have 
underlying causes of action, namely ac-
tions to collect on plaintiffs' various judg-
ments entered against Barrie Peterson.19 
Plaintiff's need not establish violations of 
RICO or the charging or garnishment or-
ders in order to maintain a cause of ac-
tion sufficient to have the various entities 
determined to be the alter egos of Barrie 
Peterson. Moreover, the underlying 
cause of action need not be found in the 
relationship between the insider and his 
alter ego. Thus, in Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc. v. Venners, 165 F.3d 912 
(4th Cir.1998) (unpublished), the Fourth 
Circuit, in an action based upon the 
Commodities Exchange Act, stated that 
the plaintiff could have pursued the alter 
ego in an enforcement proceeding follow-
ing a judgment against the corporation. 
Similarly in Greenberg, the underlying 
cause of action was based on a violation 
of the Consumer Finance Act, not the ac-
tions by the corporate insider whose as-
sets were sought through a traditional 
veil piercing action. See Greenberg, 255 
Va. at 594, 499 S.E.2d 266. Accordingly, 
the dismissal of the various counts for 
RICO, conspiracy, and violation of the 
charging and garnishment orders does 
not preclude the plaintiffs from succeed-
ing on their reverse piercing claim. 
3. Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Exist 
(11] Given the conclusion that plaintiffs 
may pursue their reverse piercing claim 
under Vll'ginia law, the question that re-
mains is whether either party is entitled to 
summary judgment based on the current 
record. More precisely, the question is 
whether the current record discloses any 
disputed material facts concerning wheth-
er the defendants abused the corporate 
and partnership forms so as to perpetrate 
18. FletcherCyc. Corp.§ 41.10. 
a fraud or crime, evade a personal obli-
gation, or commit an injustice. A compo-
nent of this is whether the transactions in 
question were undertaken with the pur-
pose of hindering and defrauding Barrie 
Peterson's creditors in their attempt to 
collect on the judgments against him. A 
close review of the current record reflects 
that on this issue, material facts are indeed 
genuinely disputed, rendering summary 
judgment inappropriate. See Perpetual, 
974 F .2d at 548-49 (determining the pur-
pose of various transactions in connection 
with an alter ego allegation is a jury ques-
tion). 
While the occurrence of certain transac-
tions is not in question, their purpose is. 
Thus, the parties agree that certain of 
Barrie Peterson's captive corporations 
made payments to cover his personal living 
expenses, but they sharply dispute wheth-
er Barrie Peterson directed these pay-
ments with the intent to defraud creditors 
or to evade a personal obligation. The 
parties also agree that BHG transferred 
funds to other Barrie Peterson-controlled 
entities. Plaintiffs allege, however, that 
these entities (First Flight, PVD Limited 
Partnership, Occoquan Limited Partner-
ship) bad no obligation or right to these 
funds and that these transfers were used 
to pay Barrie Peterson's personal living 
expenses. Yet another transaction in 
which the purpose is disputed is the distri-
bution by First Flight of over $4.3 million 
to Scott Peterson between 1996 and 1999 
and the subsequent transfer by Scott Pe-
terson of $687,000 to BHG. While the par-
ties agree that these distributions oc-
curred, they disagree over whether these 
distributions were in violation of the First 
Flight Partnership Agreement and wheth-
er, therefore, approximately one-half of 
these funds should have been distributed 
to Barrie Peterson, in which event they 
may have been subject to plaintiffs' charg-
ing order on Barrie Peterson's interest in 
19. This issue may be revisited by the panies 
following hearing on the merits. 
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the partnership. Finally, the parties 
agree that between 1996 and 1999, First 
Flight, Maryland Air Industries, and BOI 
transferred large sums of money to BHG, 
of which some amount was in excess of the 
cost of the management services provided 
to these organizations. Plaintiffs argue 
that these transfers were made without a 
valid business purpose and to enable BHG 
to pay the personal expenses of Barrie 
Peterson while keeping his creditors from 
reaching these funds. Defendants counter 
by asserting that the allocation of these 
costs was reasonable and valid in these 
circumstances and that all transfers had a 
valid business purpose. These are all dis· 
puted issues of material fact. Accordingly, 
the cross motions for summary judgment 
must be denied. 
4- Nancy and Scott Peterson Cannot 
Be the Alter Egos of Barrie Peter-
son. 
[12] The parties cite no case that au-
thoritatively discusses whether the alter 
ego test is properly applicable to establish 
that an individual, not a corporation or 
partnership, is the alter ego of another 
individual. Nor is this surprising, for, on 
principle, it is clear that an individual can· 
not be the alter ego of another individual. 
The alter ego test was developed to pro-
vide creditors with a means of disregard-
ing the corporate or limited partnership 
form when that legal fiction has been 
abused by corporate insiders. See Chea-
tle, 234 Va. at 212, 360 S.E.2d 828. In 
Vu-ginia, the doctrine has only been em-
ployed to enable a court to disregard the 
separate legal identity of corporations or 
limited partnerships. See, e.g., O'Hazza, 
246 Va. at 115, 431 S.E.2d 318 (refening 
only to corporation as alter ego of individu-
al); Chea.tle, 234 Va. at 2~13, 360 S.E.2d 
828.20 Plaintiffs' central argument is that 
it would be unfair to permit Barrie Peter-
son to use Nancy and Scott Peterson to 
avoid payment to his creditors. Even as-
20. The only case purponing to find an indi-
vidual to be an alter ego or another individual 
is the unreported decision of In n! Bohrer, 
1998 WL 228198 (4th Cir.1998 (Maryland)). 
suming, arguendo, the appeal of this 
broad, general argument, it does not 
change or modify the scope of the alter 
ego doctrine, which is limited to defining 
the circumstances under which the corpo-
rate or limited partnership forms may be 
disregarded. 
This does not mean that plaintiffs were 
without a remedy for their concern over 
the roles that Nancy Peterson and Scott 
Peterson played in the alleged attempt to 
hinder the plaintiffs from collecting on the 
judgment. For example, plaintiffs might 
have asserted a conspiracy claim that Scott 
Peterson aided his father to avoid his legal 
obligations. However, these claims are 
not before the Court. Absent these 
claims, Scott and Nancy Peterson are not 
properly parties to this action. 
IV 
For all the reasons stated above, defen-
dants' joint motion for summary judgment 
is granted in part as to Nancy and Scott 
Peterson and denied in all other respects. 
The Clerk is directed to forward this 
Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of rec-
ord. 
Barbara mORNE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
WLR FOODS, INC., and Wampler 
Foods, Inc., Defendants. 
No. CIV .A. 3:00CV24. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. West Vu-ginia, 
Martinsburg Division. 
Aug. 29, 2000. 
Former employee brought action 
against employer in state court for retalia-
As this case did not involve Virginia law, but 
rather the federal bankruptcy code, its rele-
vance to this matter is limited. 
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ORDERED that this case is 018- 3. Judgment ~540 
MISSED. Under federal principles of res judica-
C.F. TRUST, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FIRST FLIGHT LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, et al., 
Defendants. 
No. CIV .A. 99-1742-A. 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Vll'ginia, 
Alexandria Division. 
March 22, 2001. 
As Amended April 26, 2000. 
Judgment creditors sued debtor's cor-
porations and limited partnerships to col-
lect on judgments. The District Court, El-
lis, J., held that: (1) reverse piercing of 
corporate veil was warranted, and (2) ap-
pointment of receiver was not warranted. 
Judgment for plaintiffs. 
1. Judgment ~580, 701 
Finding in judgment creditor's prior 
suit against sole owner of corporation, that 
corporation was his alter ego, was res judi-
cata in subsequent action by same creditor 
to pierce corporate veil in reverse, even if 
corporation was not named as party in 
prior action; prior judgment was final, 
even if it was on appeal, and fact that 
owner was party in prior action gave rise 
to sufficient identity of parties. 
2. Federal Courts ~420 
Federal law determines res judicata 
effect of federal court judgment, regard-
less of whether judgment was based on 
state or federal law. Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments§ 87. 
ta, three factors must be established to 
give prior ruling preclusive effect: (1) iden-
tity of cause of action between both suits; 
(2) final judgment on merits in prior suit; 
and (3) identity of parties or their privies 
in the two suits. 
4. Partnership ~349 
Under Virginia law "reverse piercing 
of corporate veil" doctrine is applicable to 
limited partnerships as well as corpora-
tions. 
See publication Words and Phras· 
es for other judicial constructions 
and definitions. 
5. Corporations ~1.4(1) 
"Reverse piercing of corporate veil" 
doctrine is not independent cause of action; 
rather it establishes means of imposing 
liability on underlying cause of action. 
6. Corporations ~1.4(1) 
. Under Vll'ginia law, as predicted by 
federal district court, judgment creditor 
can reverse pierce corporate veil based on 
cause of action to collect on owner's unpaid 
debt. 
7. Corporations ~1.4(2, 3) 
Although inquiry is fact-specific, Vir-
ginia law allows piercing of corporate veil 
only under exceptional circumstances, 
which occur (1) when unity of interest and 
ownership is such that separate personali-
ties of corporation and individual no longer 
exist and to adhere to that separateness 
would work injustice, and (2) when share-
holder bas used corporation to evade per-
sonal obligation, to perpetrate fraud or 
crime, to commit injustice, or to gain un-
fair advantage. 
8. Partnership e=>165 
Under Vll'ginia law, reverse piercing 
of corporate veil was warranted where 
judgment debtor had used his limited part-
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nership interest to evade liability to judg-
ment creditors; debtor maintained control 
over partnership and its distributions de-
spite official transfer of control and owner-
ship to his son, and siphoned business 
assets for his personal use in manner 
which served no legitimate business pur-
pose. 
9. Receivers <P1 
Under Virginia law, court's power to 
appoint receiver should be exercised with 
caution and only in strong case. 
10. Corporations e=>553(1, 3) 
Under VU"ginia law, court of equity is 
not empowered to appoint receiver for cor-
poration absent proof of insolvency, fraud, 
waste, or improper conduct. 
11. Corporations e=>553(3) 
Partnership e=>325(2) 
Under Virginia law, determinations 
that business entities were alter egos of 
judgment debtor and that he had used 
them to evade his personal obligations 
were insufficient to justify appointment of 
receiver, where entities were neither being 
liquidated nor dissolved. 
Thomas Lawrence Albert, Birch, Hor-
ton, Bittner & Cherot, Washington, DC, 
James Robert Schroll, Bean, Kinney & 
Korman, P.C., Arlington, VA. for Plain-
tiffs. 
Russell James Gaspar, Cohen Mohr 
L.L.P., Washington, DC, James Thomas 
Bacon, Allred, Bacon, Halfhill, Landau & 
Young, P.C., Fairfax, VA. for Defendants. 
1. See infra, 13. 
2. Plaintiffs' motion was denied. Defendants' 
motion was granted as to Nancy Peterson and 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
ELLIS, District Judge. 
This action is plaintiffs' latest attempt in 
a seven year effort to collect in full the 
more than $8 million in judgments they 
hold against defendant Barrie Peterson. 
After pursuing the full range of conven-
tional collection remedies 1-largely unsuc-
cessfully-plaintiffs brought this action 
against Barrie Peterson and various of his 
entities (i) alleging that Peterson used his 
various corporations and partnerships as 
alter egos to avoid payment of his obli-
gations under the judgments and (ii) seek-
ing to pierce the corporate veil in reverse 
to reach the assets of these entities. A 
four-day Bench trial followed the comple-
tion of discovery and disposition of the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. 2 This Memorandum Opinion sets 
forth the Court's findings of fact and con-
clusions of law pursuant to Rule 52, Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Parties, Related Entities, and 
Background of Dispute 
1. C.F. Trust is a Florida corporation 
with its principal place of business in Flori-
da. C.F. Trust owns two commercial 
notes (the "CF Notes") dated November 1, 
1993 on which Barrie Peterson individual-
ly, Barrie Peterson, Trustee, and Nancy 
Peterson are personally liable in the total 
original principal amount of $6,064,903.57. 
Following an event of default, C.F. Trust 
obtained a judgment, entered on February 
1, 1996 against Barrie Peterson individual-
ly, Barrie Peterson, Trustee, and Nancy 
Peterson jointly and severally on their en-
dorsements of the CF Notes, in the total 
original principal amount of $6,117,813 plus 
Scott Peterson, but was denied in all other 
respects. See C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight 
Lid. Partnership, 111 F.Supp.2d 734 (E.D.Va. 
2000); infra '1114 n. 7. 
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post-judgment interest at the rate of 9% 
per annum. See C.F. Trus~ Inc. v. Peter-
son, Law No. 39433 (Prince William Coun-
ty Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 1996). C.F. Trust also 
has a charging order dated September 8, 
1998, as corrected September 28, 1998, 
charging the entire partnership interests 
of the Petersons in, inter alia, First Flight 
Limited Partnership ("First Flight"), PVD 
Limited Partnership ("PVD"), and Occo-
quan Limited Partnership ("Occoquan") 
with payment of the CF Judgments. See 
C.F. Trust, Inc. v. Peterson, Order, Civ. A. 
Nos. 96-264-A, ~265-A (E.D.Va. Sept. 
28, 1998). Pursuant to this charging or-
der, the Petersons are required "to take all 
available steps to cause the Specified Part-
nerships to comply with their duties under 
this Charging Order." 
2. Atlantic Funding Corporation ("At-
lantic Funding'') is a Nevada corporation 
with its principal place of business in Flori-
da. Atlantic Funding owns a Note (the 
"AFC Note") on which Barrie Peterson 
individually and as Trustee is liable in the 
total original principal amount of 
$1,000,000. Atlantic Funding also has a 
judgment, entered November 15, 1991, 
against Barrie Peterson individually and as 
Trustee, on the AFC Note in the total 
principal amount of $1,217,201.96 plus in-
terest. See Resolutitm Trust Cqrp. v. Pe-
terson, Order, Civ. A No. 91-1084-A 
(E.D.Va. Nov. 15, 1991). Atlantic Funding 
has also obtained two charging orders on 
its judgment from the Prince William 
County Circuit Court, one dated March 1, 
1996 charging the partnership interest of 
Barrie Peterson in First Flight and anoth-
er dated March 15, 1996 charging Barrie 
Peterson's partnership interest in PVD. 
See Atlantic Funding Cqrp. v. Peterson, 
Chancery No. 39647 (Prince William Coun-
3. For further details of the history of owner-
ship and control of First Flight, see infra 
'il'lllS-20. 
ty Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1996); Atlantic Fund-
ing Cqrp. v. Peterson, Chancery No. 39459 
(Prince William County Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 
1996). 
3. Defendant Barrie Peterson is an in-
dividual residing in Fairfax, VIrginia. 
4. Nancy Peterson, a resident of Fair-
fax, Vll'ginia, is the wife of Barrie Peter-
son. 
5. Scott Peterson, a resident of Fair-
fax, Virginia, is Barrie Peterson's son. 
6. Defendant First Flight is a limited 
partnership with its principal place of busi-
ness in Woodbridge, Vll'ginia. Barrie Pe-
terson and Scott Peterson each hold a 49% 
limited partnership interest in First 
Flight. The general partner is the Upland 
Group, a corporation wholly owned and 
controlled by Scott Peterson.3 First 
Flight owns and operates a commercialfm-
dustrial rental property in Hagerstown, 
Maryland, lmown as the Top Flight Air-
park. Top Flight Airpark consists of a 
building of approximately 1 million square 
feet in size, located on 55 acres near the 
Hagerstown Airport. Space in the build-
ing is leased to approximately 1~20 ten-
ants. First Flight employs approximately 
12 people at the Airpark, including a secre-
tary/office manager, roofers, and mainte-
nance and security personnel. Barrie Pe-
terson used First Flight funds to pay his 
personal expenses directly and indirectly 
through distributions to Scott Peterson 
and payments to Birchwood Holdings 
Group ("BHG"). See infra 1!1!19-21, 27. 
7. BHG is a corporation organized un-
der the laws of Vu-ginia and has its princi-
pal place of business in Woodbridge, VIrgi-
nia. Until June 2000, when BHG was sold 
to Atlantic Funding at a judicial sale, it 
was wholly owned by Barrie Peterson.4 
4. By Order dated June 19, 2000, plaintiff At· 
lantic Funding, became the sole owner of 
BHG and Birchwood Organizations Inc. See 
Atlantic Funding Corp. v. Peterson, Order, Civ-
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BHG provided administrative and manage-
ment services, chiefly to other Barrie Pe-
terson-controlled entities. Also, BHG was 
one of the Barrie Peterson controlled enti-
ties he used as part of his scheme to avoid 
plaintiffs' judgments and charging orders 
by having his personal expenses paid with 
BHG funds. See infra 111128-29. 
8. Birchwood Organizations, Inc. 
("BOI") is a corporation organized under 
the laws of VU'ginia and has its principal 
place of business in Woodbridge, Vll'ginia. 
Until its judicial sale in June 2000, BOI 
was wholly owned by Barrie Peterson. 
BOI, through Barrie Peterson-the com-
pany's president and sole employee-pur-
ported to provide technical support to 
manage and maintain the operating sys-
tems at Top Flight Airpark, and to super-
vise First Flight's employees in their day-
to-day operations. BOI charged First 
Flight a fee based on four percent of its 
rental revenues at Top Flight. This fee 
totaled approximately $308,000 for 1996-
1998.5 BOI also paid Barrie Peterson's 
personal expenses directly and indirectly 
through payments to BHG, that were un-
supported by any legitimate business pur-
pose. See infra 111127, 28 n. 16. 
9. Defendant Maryland Air Industries, 
Inc. ("Maryland Air") is a Vll'ginia corpo-
ration, wholly owned and controlled by 
Barrie Peterson. In C.F. Trust v. Peter-
son, Civil Action No. 97-2003-A (E.D.Va. 
Jan. 8, 1999), Maryland Air was deter-
mined to be the alter ego of Barrie Peter-
son. 
il Action No. 91-1084-A (E.D. Va. June 19, 
2000). 
S. Barrie Peterson chose to provide his man-
agement services to First Flight through BOI, 
10. PVD is a VU'ginia limited partner-
ship. Barrie Peterson is PVD's sole gen-
eral partner and its 93% limited partner. 
He is personally liable on PVD indebted-
ness secured by its real property. His 
wife, Nancy Peterson, is a 5% limited part-
nerofPVD. 
11. Occoquan is a Vll'ginia limited part-
nership. Barrie Peterson, a 39% limited 
partner in Occoquan, owns an interest in 
Occoquan's sole general partner and is 
personally liable for Occoquan's indebted-
ness, which is secured by Occoquan's real 
property. 
12. Carnett Commercial Investors, 
Inc., ("Carnett") is owned by Scott Peter-
son. Carnett holds a judgment against 
Barrie Peterson, individually and as Trust-
ee, in the principal amount of 
$1,710,909.67. This judgment was entered 
by the Prince William County Circuit 
Court on July 30, 1993. On August 10, 
1993, Carnett obtained a charging order on 
its judgment from the Prince William 
County Circuit Court against Barrie Pe-
terson's partnership interest in First 
Flight. To the extent that the Carnett 
judgment against Barrie Peterson remains 
valid, it is in a priority position superior to 
the judgments held by C.F. Trust and 
Atlantic Funding. 
ll. Procedural History 
13. The parties in this action have en-
gaged in extensive and protracted litiga-
tion regarding plaintiffs' effort to collect on 
rather than directly as a salary, in order to 
make use of net operating loss cany·forwards 
that BOI had accumulated. Barrie Peterson 
did not receive a salary from BOJ. 
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their judgments. A listing of the principal 
cases follows: 
(i) C.F. Trust v. Peterson, Civil Action 
No. 96-1128-A (E.D.Va. Dec. 9, 1996) 
(voiding as a fraudulent conveyance a 
deed of trust that Barrie and Nancy 
Peterson placed on their residence); 
(ii) C.F. Trust. Inc. v. DEP, Inc., Adver-
sary Proceeding No. 97-1017 
(Bankr.E.D.Va. Oct. 31, 1997) (find-
ing J.P. Development, a corporation 
wholly owned and controlled by 
Scott Peterson, to be Barrie Peter-
son's alter ego), affd sub nom. J.P. 
Development. Inc. v. C.F. Trust, 
Inc., C.A. No. 98-0079 (E.D.Va. Apr. 
3, 1999), Case No. ~1670 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 5, 1999); 
(iii) C.F. Trust, Inc. v. Peterson, Civil 
Action No. 97-2003-A (E.D.Va. Jan. 
8, 1999) (finding (a) that Maryland 
Air Industries and Maryland Air In-
ternational were the alter egos of 
both Barrie and Scott Peterson, (b) 
that Scott Peterson used shell cor-
porations to create appearance of 
encumbrances to frustrate legiti-
mate creditors, and (c) that transfer 
of property to Scott Peterson was 
void as a fraudulent conveyance), 
appeal pending sub nom. C.F. 
Trust. Inc. v. Jubal, Inc., 99-1197, 
99-1198, 99-1199 (consolidated) (4th 
Cir.1999); 
(iv) Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181 
(4th Cir.1998) (upholding the actions 
of CF Trust in acquiring notes and 
judgments against defendants); 
(v) DEP, Inc. v. Jacques, Adversary 
Proceeding No. 97-1049 (Bankr. 
E.D.Va. Sept. 16, 1997) (declaring 
that CF Trust had a lawful first 
deed of trust encumbering two DEP 
properties); 
6. The parties dispute the total amount or the 
judgments that is still outstanding. Deren-
dants concede that approximately $3.5 mil-
(vi) Peterson v. Atlantic Funding Corp., 
Civil Action No. 96-531-A (E.D.Va. 
1996) (dismissing Barrie Peterson's 
claim that AFC judgment was not 
enforceable against him); 
(vii) DEP, Inc. v. Atlantic Funding 
Corp., Adversary Proceeding, No. 
96-1167-SSM (Bankr.E.D.Va.1996); 
(viii) Peterson v. Atlantic Funding 
Corp., Civil Action No. 96-1476-A 
(E.D.Va.1996) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of Atlantic 
Funding); 
(ix) Peterson v. Cooley, Chancery No. 
41122 (Prince William County Circ. 
Ctl997) (suit by Barrie Peterson 
against AFC and one of its officers 
alleging tortious interference and 
conspiracy in connection with acqui-
sition of the Judgment); 
(x) Atlantic Funding Corp. v. Peterson, 
Civil Action No. 91-1084 (E.D.Va. 
1991) (finding of contempt against 
Barrie Peterson for failure to pro-
duce stock certificates). 
This extensive and protracted litigation 
is strong evidence of Barrie Peterson's 
intent and efforts to evade payment of the 
outstanding amount due on plaintiffs' judg-
ments.6 
14. The instant suit, filed in November 
1999, initially included claims for: (i) a 
declaratory judgment that First Flight, 
BHG, BOI, PVD, Maryland Air, Occo-
quan, Scott Peterson, Nancy Peterson, 
and other entities owned by Barrie or 
Scott Peterson are Barrie Peterson's alter 
egos; (ii) an injunction against asset 
transfers; (iii) an appointment of a receiv-
er; (iv) violations of charging orders; (v) 
violation of a garnishment order; (vi) a 
declaratory judgment that the Carnett 
lion or the judgment is still owed to the plain-
tiffs. 
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charging order issued against Barrie Pe-
terson is extinguished; (vii) conspiracy to 
injure plaintiffs in their trade or business 
in violation of Va.Code § 18.2-499 & 500; 
(viii) common law conspiracy; (ix) RICO 
violations; and (x) costs and attorneys' 
fees. Court rulings and voluntary dis-
missals left for trial only three counts 
against Barrie Peterson, First Flight, and 
Maryland Air: (i) declaratory judgment 
that entities are alter egos of Barrie Pe-
terson; (ii) injunction against asset trans-
fers; and (iii) appointment of a receiver. 7 
IlL Abuse of the First Flight 
Partnership and its Part-
nership Distributions 
15. The record convincingly reflects 
that Barrie Peterson abused the First 
Flight Partnership by using it as a device 
to pay his personal expenses while insulat-
ing himself from payment of plaintiffs' out-
standing judgments. An important initial 
step in this scheme was the transfer of 
Barrie Peterson's ownership interest in 
First Flight to his son and Upland, a cor-
poration wholly owned by his son. As 
noted, both Barrie Peterson and Scott Pe-
terson currently hold 49% limited partner-
ship interests in First Flighl Until Au-
gust 27, 1992, Barrie Peterson owned or 
controlled 100% of the partnership interest 
in First Flight, directly as 98% and sole 
limited partner and indirectly through his 
wholly owned Top Flight AirPark. Inc. 
7. By Order dated March 31. 2000, the Court 
dismissed the RICO count. See C.F. Trust, 
Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership, Order, 
C.A. No. 99-1742-A (E.D.Va. Mar. 31, 2000). 
On June 23, 2000, plaintiffs' filed a motion to 
dismiss voluntarily Counts IV, VI, VII, VIII, 
and X, and defendants Occoquan and Carnett 
pursuant to Rule 4l(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. See 
C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership, 
Order, C.A. No. 99-1742-A (E.D. Va. June 23. 
2000). According to the parties' memoranda, 
plaintiffs accepted a $15.000 offer of judg· 
ment from BHG on Count V of the complaint 
(violation of a garnishment order). Further· 
more, by Order dated March 31, 2000. this 
Court dismissed PVD Limited Partnership, a 
Florida corporation. in order to maintain di-
versity jurisdiction. See C.F. Trust, Inc. v, 
("Top Flight"), the sole general partner 
owning a 2% limited partnership interesl 
On August 27, 1992, Upland, a corporation 
wholly owned and controlled by Scott Pe-
terson, became the sole general partner of 
First Flight. At this time, Upland also 
received a 2% partnership interest. 
16. Upland paid only a nominal fee to 
become First Flight's General Partner. 
At the time Upland became First Flight's 
general partner, First Flight was in bank-
ruptcy and had defaulted on a loan of 
approximately $12-13 million, secured by 
Barrie Peterson. In March 1996, First 
Flight received a loan of $6.5 million from 
Allied Capital Commercial Corporation 
("Allied") from a refinancing of the Top 
Flight AirPark ("Allied Loan"). First 
Flight used the proceeds of this loan to 
setUe the prior debt at a deep discount for 
First Flight and Barrie Peterson. The 
proceeds of the Allied Loan were also used 
to relieve Barrie Peterson of $3,275,536 of 
personal liability to UBS Securities. In 
1997, First Flight obtained a $10 million 
loan, a portion of which was used to pay 
off the Allied Loan. 
17. At about the same time that First 
Flight assumed the Allied Loan, Barrie 
Peterson transferred a 49% limited part-
nership interest in First Flight to Scott 
First Flight Ltd. Partnership, Order, C.A. No. 
99-1742-A (E.D.Va. Mar. 31, 2000). Further-
more. by Order dated August 25, 2000, this 
Court dismissed BHG and BOI for lack of 
controversy. See C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First 
Flight Ltd. Partnership, Order, C.A. No. 99-
1742-A (E.D.Va. Aug. 25, 2000); Atlantic 
Funding Corp. v. Peterson, Order, C.A. No. 91-
1084-A (E.D. Va. June 19, 2000) (order allow-
ing Atlantic Funding to become the sole own-
er of BHG and 801}. Finally. by Order dated 
August 25. 2000. defendants' partial summary 
judgment was granted in favor of Nancy Pe-
terson and Scott Peterson, resulting in their 
dismissal from the action. See C.F. Trust, Inc. 
v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership, Order, C.A. 
No. 99-1742-A (E.D.Va. Aug. 25, 2000). 
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Peterson. Scott Peterson testified that it 
was his financial ability that made the 
Allied Loan refinancing possible, and that 
as a result, the Loan Agreement between 
First Flight and Allied provided that Scott 
Peterson would personally guarantee the 
loan and, as President of Upland, would 
have "exclusive responsibility for the day-
to-day management" of First Flight's busi-
ness operations. Accordingly, he testified 
that in consideration of his guarantee of 
the Allied Loan, he became a 49% limited 
partner in First Flight and was entitled to 
receive all distributions made by the part-
nership. This testimony, however, is not 
credible. Instead of serving the interests 
of Allied Capital, the transfer of ownership 
from Barrie Peterson to Scott Peterson 
was the next critical step in Barrie Peter-
son's scheme to avoid payment of his debts 
to the plaintiffs in this case. This is so 
because, despite the official transfer of 
ownership, (i) Barrie Peterson maintained 
control over First Flight's operations, con-
trary to the terms of the Loan Agreement, 
and (ii) First Flight's Partnership Agree-
ment did not permit Scott Peterson to 
have unilateral control over the distribu-
tions to First Flight's limited partners. 
18. Moreover, the record as a whole 
contradicts Scott Peterson's testimony that 
be had complete control over First Flight. 
Barrie Peterson performed financial, ad-
ministrative, management, technical, and 
other services for First Flight. And, BOI, 
through Barrie Peterson-that company's 
president and sole employee-provided 
technical support to manage and maintain 
the operating systems at Top Flight Air-
park and to supervise First Flight's em-
ployees in their day-to-day operations. In 
this position, Barrie Peterson bad the sole 
authority to direct First Flight expendi-
tures on routine maintenance or operation-
al expenses. Non-routine expenses re-
quired approval, at least nominally, from 
Scott Peterson in his capacity as President 
of the Upland Group, First Flight's gener-
al partner. Accordingly, Barrie Peterson 
accounted for approximately 90% of First 
Flight's work and spent more time at First 
Flight than anyone else. Furthermore, 
Scott Peterson testified that he visited 
First Flight at most, once a week and that 
all decisions regarding First Flight were 
made only after obtaining his father's ap-
proval. In sum, the record reflects that 
Barrie Peterson retained decisionmaking 
control over First Flight contrary to the 
terms of the Allied Loan and the First 
Flight partnership agreement. This con-
trol manifested itself, as will be seen, in 
transfers of substantial funds from First 
Flight to Scott Peterson and to other Bar-
rie Peterson-controlled entities as part of 
the scheme to have Barrie Peterson's per-
sonal expenses paid with funds that were 
beyond the reach of plaintiffs' charging 
orders. 
19. Barrie Peterson utilized his de fac-
w control over First Flight to direct that it 
make distributions of substantial funds to 
Scott Peterson and to BHG for the pay-
ment of Barrie Peterson's personal ex-
penses. Contrary to the testimony of Bar-
rie Peterson and Scott Peterson, neither 
the loan documentation, nor First Flight's 
partnership agreement, enabled Scott Pe-
terson or Upland to make unilateral deci-
sions regarding First Flight's partnership 
distributions. Despite this, from March 
15, 1996 to December 31, 1999, Scott Pe-
terson received over $4.3 million in distri-
butions from First Flight while making, at 
most, $800,000 in capital contributions. 
Had these funds been properly distributed, 
Barrie Peterson would have been entitled 
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to a distribution of approximately $2.15 
million, an amount which would then have 
been subject to plaintiffs' charging orders 
and thus used to satisfy plaintiffs' judg-
ments. 
20. The more than $4 million in distri-
butions to Scott Peterson, made chiefly 
from the proceeds of the 1997 $10 million 
loan, contravened the requirements of the 
First Flight partnership agreement and 
therefore conclusively establish that First 
Flight and Upland failed to follow the req-
uisite business and corporate formalities. 
Defendants mistakenly contend that Sec-
tions 12.5 and 12.6 of First Flight's part-
nership agreement permitted the distribu-
tion of over $4 million to Scott Peterson 
while distributing nothing to Barrie Peter-
son. 8 This argument fails because even 
assuming funds were available for distribu-
tion after repayment of the Allied Loan 
from the proceeds of the 1997 refinancing 
of the Top Flight Airpack, Scott Peterson 
was still not entitled to distributions under 
Section 7.22 of the Partnership Agreement 
because his capital account never showed a 
positive balance. 
21. Scott Peterson made capital contri-
butions to First Flight in small amounts 
only after he distributed to himself the 
8. First Flight's partnership agreement provid· 
ed that "Cash From Operations . . . shall be 
distributed 98% to the Limited Partners on a 
Pro Rata Basis" and that "Cash from Finane· 
ings [after repayments of the refinanced debt, 
establishment of reserves and repayment of 
capital contributions] will be distributed ••. 
first, to the Limited Partners on a Pro Rata 
Basis." First Flight Partnership Agreement 
§§ 12.5, 12.6. Furthermore, the agreement 
defines "Pro Rata Basis" as "an allocation or 
distribution to the Limited Partners in pro-
portion to their respective Capital Contribu-
tions." /d.§ 7.22. 
$4.3 million. Taking into account the re-
sult of the contributions he made to First 
Flight and the distributions that were 
made to him, Scott Peterson's capital ac-
count with First Flight showed a negative 
balance of $3.17 million by the end of 1999. 
Moreover, to the extent that Scott Peter-
son's capital account was greater than Bar-
rie Peterson's, this was only a result of the 
fact that when Barrie Peterson transferred 
49% of the limited partnership to Scott 
Peterson for little or no consideration, he 
did not also transfer a corresponding share 
of his existing negative capital balance. 
Had he done so, Scott Peterson's capital 
account would have been less than Barrie 
Peterson's. Accordingly, distributions 
should have been made in proportion to 
each limited partner's respective owner-
ship interests. 
22. Defendants also argue that even if 
sections 12.5 and 12.6 do not provide suffi-
cient authority, the Amendment of the 
partnership agreement shortly after the 
admission of Scott Peterson to the First 
Flight Partnership enabled him. as the 
General Partner, to distnbute all of First 
Flight's limited partnership distributions 
only to himself.9 This argument fails be-
cause the partnership agreement does not 
confer this authority. The Amendment 
9. The Amendment provides: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in the 
agreement to the contrary the General Part· 
ner shall have the sole right and authority 
to determine whether the profits of the 
Pannership should be distributed to the 
limited partners and that its decision shall 
be binding on the Partnership. No profits, 
distributions, allocations, proceeds or any 
other payments of any kind shall be paid by 
the Partnership to any limited partner un-
less such payment is approved in writing by 
the General Partner, in his sole discretion. 
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does not specify that the General Partner 
can detennine to whom the distributions 
will be made; rather, the General Partner 
can only detennine whether distributions 
shall be made. Accordingly, distributions 
made pursuant to the Amendment must be 
made to each limited partner based on his 
respective partnership interest. Finally, 
assuming arguem:lo that the Amendment 
pennitted Scott Peterson to make all the 
distributions to himself, his actions were 
still in violation of the First Flight part. 
nership agreement because the Amend-
ment requires that any payment or distri-
bution must be approved in writing. No 
written documentation exists to support 
this distribution. 
23. The record as a whole reflects that 
Barrie Peterson structured and controlled 
his various entities to achieve the payment 
of his personal expenses with funds that 
were beyond the reach of plaintiffs' charg-
ing orders. The transfer in ownership was 
not a result of Scott Peterson's loan guar-
antee, but rather a gift to enable Barrie 
Peterson to develop and further his 
scheme to evade payment of the plaintiffs' 
judgments. 
24. The improper $4.3 million distribu-
tion to Scott Peterson had two primary 
effects. First, had the distribution been 
properly paid to the limited partners pro 
mta, as required, approximately $2 million 
would have been distributed to Barrie Pe-
10. Scott Peterson and Barrie Peterson's testi· 
mony was contradictory as to the purpose 
and nature of the $687,000 payments to BHG. 
Scott Peterson testified that he was repaying 
loans that were made directly from his father; 
while Barrie Peterson testified that Scott Pe· 
terson was repaying loans made from Barrie 
Peterson-controlled entities. More signifi. 
candy, though, there is no proof, other than 
the Petersons' testimony, that these loans 
terson, and this amount would then have 
been subject to collection by plaintiffs 
through the operation of their valid charg-
ing orders. Second, the improper distri-
bution provided Scott Peterson with funds 
he could transfer to BHG, which could 
then pay Barrie Peterson's personal ex-
penses with funds beyond the reach of 
plaintiffs' charging orders. Scott Peterson 
did precisely this, transferring approxi-
mately $687,000 to BHG, ultimately to be 
used to pay Barrie Peterson's personal 
expenses.10 Also, Scott Peterson used a 
portion of the $4.3 million distribution to 
funnel funds back to First Flight to ensure 
its solvency after First Flight had made 
substantial overpayments to BHG to pay 
Barrie Peterson's personal expenses. See 
infra Part IV. 
IV. Abuse of BHG and Other Con-
trolled Entities to Pay Bani.e Pe-
terson's Personal Expemes 
25. The record also convincingly re-
flects that Barrie Peterson accomplished 
his scheme to evade plaintiffs' judgments 
and charging orders by impermissibly us-
ing BHG to pay his personal expenses. 
This scheme enabled BHG to collect ap-
proximately $1.9 million in overpayments 
for the administrative services it provided 
to Barrie Peterson-controlled entities. 
BHG then used these funds to pay over $2 
million in Barrie Peterson's personal ex-
penses.11 
were ever made. Because the testimony of 
both Barrie and Scott Peterson, in this case, 
was not credible. there is no basis to conclude 
that these distributions and overpayments to 
BHG and BOI were anything other than an 
attempt to evade Barrie Peterson's personal 
obligations to the judgment creditors. 
II. For a description of the personal expenses 
paid by BHG, see infra 'V'l 28-29. 
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26. BHG provided management and 
administrative services to many of the 
companies Barrie Peterson and Scott Pe-
terson owned, controlled, and operated. 
These services included financial record-
keeping and assistance in tax return prep-
aration, administration of payroll and ac-
counts payable functions, client billing, 
lease administration, and similar support 
services. BHG charged fees to Peterson 
entities in accordance with an operating 
cost allocation formula that had been in 
effect since 1992, based in part on the 
recommendation of BHG's accountant. 
This formula allocated BHG's costs plus a 
10% profit among the various entities, us-
ing BHG's services. 
27. During the course of the year, the 
entities receiving management support 
from BHG would often pay funds to BHG, 
purportedly as an advance of the fee to be 
owed through the cost allocation formula. 
When the cost allocation was determined 
during the following year, the amount 
would be listed either as a liability or as 
an asset on the company's books, depend-
ing on whether the entity had overpaid or 
underpaid under the allocation formula 
during the previous year. These pre-pay-
ments, however, were not based on any 
estimate of that entity's share of the cost 
allocation, but instead were simply a 
means by which Barrie Peterson could 
pay his personal expenses with funds be-
yond the reach of plaintiffs' charging or-
ders. As a result of these pre-payments, 
Barrie Peterson and Scott Peterson con-
12. In 1996, First Flight paid BHG $172,019 
more than the cost allocation for management 
and administrative services. No sup.,orting 
documentation for the overpayment, such as 
loan documents providing for interest or re-
payments terms. was provided. In 1997, 
First Flight paid BHG $67,286 more than the 
cost allocation for management and adminis-
trative services. This amount represented 
more than 91% of BHG's actual costs. In 
1998, First Flight paid BHG $243,000 more 
trolled entities transferred to BHG $1.9 
million in excess of the cost allocation as-
sessed by BHG. No legitimate business 
purpose was served by these excess pay-
ments, and except for the return of a 
small amount of funds to First Flight, 
BHG has never refunded these excess 
payments. Significantly, at the same time 
these excess payments were being made, 
BHG paid approximately $2 million of 
Barrie Peterson's personal expenses. The 
transfer of excess funds to BHG was ac-
complished in the following manner: 
A. BOI transferred $267,000 to BHG. 
The record does not reflect that any 
legitimate business purpose was 
served by this transfer of funds. 
BOI was not assessed a portion of 
the cost allocation, and no support-
ing documentation or evidence of 
adherence to corporate formalities 
exists for this transfer. 
B. Maryland Air transferred approxi-
mately $619,000 to BHG. This 
amount exceeded the cost allocation 
by more than $565,000. Maryland 
Air's cost allocation was $13,682,61 
in 1996, $14,970.36 in 1997, and 
$24,542.94 in 1998. 
C. During the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 
and 1999, BHG charged First Flight 
a total of at least $972,338 for man-
agement and administrative services 
rendered to First Flight. In the 
period beginning February 1, 1996, 
the date on which C.F. Trust ob-
tained the CF Judgments, through 
December 30, 1999, First Flight 
transferred to BHG approximately 
$1,350,000.12 In essence, First 
than the cost allocation for management and 
administrative services. This amount repre-
sented more than 96% of BHG's actual costs. 
No supporting documentation for these over-
payments was provided. Further support 
that this excess payment lacked a justifiable 
business purpose is the fact that during this 
same period, First Flight also paid a manage-
ment fee to BOI for Barrie Peterson's day-to-
day management and to Upland. 
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Flight was BHG's primary source of 
money, in other words, its cash cow. 
Between 1992 and 1998, it was com-
monplace for many of Barrie and 
Scott Peterson's entities not to pay 
their share of the cost allocation to 
BHG. The failure to pay would re-
sult in an entry in BHG's books that 
the owner had paid the allocation, 
and the owner then became liable to 
BHG for that amount. Despite the 
failure to pay the cost allocation by 
many Peterson-controlled entities, 
however, BHG received sufficient 
funds to continue providing services 
because of the money it received 
from First Flight. Scott Peterson 
testified that he, as First Flight's 
General Partner, would allow pay-
ments to be made to BHG without 
questioning whether the request 
was for a legitimate business pur-
pose. Instead, he testified that 
when Barrie Peterson claimed that 
BHG needed money, he would dis-
burse First Flight funds to BHG to 
cover its cash shortfall, owing to its 
payment of Barrie Peterson's per-
sonal expenses.13 
13. The arrangement between First Flight and 
BHG for the provision of management ser· 
vices was also in violation of First Flight's 
partnership agreement, which prohibited 
First Flight from entering into any transaction 
with any affiliate or related person "except on 
fair and reasonable terms which are at least 
as favorable to [First Flight] as would be the 
case in a comparable arm's-length transaction 
with an unaffUiated and unrelated entity or 
person." First Flight did not engage in an 
arm's length transaction with BHG. In the 
course of his testimony, Scott Peterson admit· 
ted that he never determined whether the fee 
charged by BHG was reasonable or ques-
tioned the legitimacy of Barrie Peterson's re-
quest for payments from First Flight. To the 
extent that First Flight made overpayments to 
BHG. no money would be available for distri· 
bution to Barrie Peterson, as a First Flight 
D. Finally, Scott Peterson transferred 
$687,000 to BHG. See supra. 1124 & 
n. 12 
28. As a result of these overpayments, 
the funds of BHG, First Flight, Maryland 
Air, and Scott Peterson were commingled 
with the funds of Barrie Peterson. Ac-
cordingly, Barrie Peterson was able to si-
phon money from these entities to pay 
approximately $2 million for his personal 
benefit with funds not subject to plaintiffs' 
charging orders. These personal expenses 
were listed in BHG's ledger under Barrie 
Peterson's shareholder account and includ-
ed: (i) personal credit card expenses, (ii) 
his and his wife's legal bills, (iii) Nancy 
Peterson's Mercedes-Benz automobile, (iv) 
mortgage payments on the Petersons' 
homes in Fairfax, Vll'ginia and Nantucket 
Island, Massachusetts, (v) college tuition 
for Peterson's son, Christopher, (vi) Barrie 
Peterson's personal country club member-
ship, and (vii) additional payments directly 
to Nancy Peterson. No minutes, resolu-
tions, memoranda, or other corporate doc-
uments authorize or support these pay-
ments.1t 
29. In addition to these personal ex-
penses, BHG made a number of payments 
limited partner, and hence. no money would 
be available for collection by plaintiffs. 
14. Notwithstanding the undisputed nature of 
these payments by BHG, Barrie Peterson tes· 
tified under oath. in a judgment-enforcement 
deposition in February 1998, that he did not 
have any documents in his possession regard-
ing (i) sources of income, funds, or money 
from June 1996 to February 1998, (ii) sources 
of income expected or anticipated after Feb-
ruary 1998, (iii) sources of income to make 
mortgage payments on his Fairfax and Nan-
tucket residences, and (iv) funds or other 
property of any kind or nature that Peterson 
had or anticipated having. See C.F. Trust, 
Inc. v. Peterson, Deposition, Civ. A. Nos. 96-
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to satisfy Barrie Peterson's personal debt 
obligations. Specifically, BHG made pay-
ments to PVD totaling approximately 
$325,000. No documentation exists to sup-
port any justification for this payment. 
PVD used a portion of these funds to 
make payments on a PVD debt on which 
Barrie Peterson was personally liable. 
BHG also satisfied a personal obligation of 
Barrie Peterson to James McClure in the 
original principal amount of $100,000 plus 
interest, and a personal obligation that 
Scott Peterson had made as security for 
Barrie Peterson's obligation to McClure. 
BHG also made payments to Occoquan in 
excess of $125,000. Again, no documenta-
tion provides any justification for this pay-
ment. Occoquan used these funds to 
make payments on a PVD debt for which 
Barrie Peterson was personally liable.15 
These are further examples of payments of 
Barrie Peterson's personal expenses or o~ 
ligations by Barrie Peterson's controlled 
entities with funds beyond the reach of 
plaintiffs' charging orders. 
30. The testimony during the trial was 
clear that the payment of over $2 million of 
Barrie Peterson's personal expenses and 
obligations was not ordinary and custom-
ary in the industry. Barrie Peterson testi-
fied that the payment of his personal ex-
penses was repayment of loans. When 
owners of businesses loan money to their 
affiliated entities, however, it is ordinary 
and customary for there to be checks di-
rectly from the owner to the entity for the 
loan and checks directly from the entity to 
the owner for the repayment. Further-
more, it ·would be ordinary and customary 
for there to be loan documents evidencing 
15. In addition to payments by BHG £or Barrie 
Peterson's personal expenses, BOI, Maryland 
Air, and First Flight also paid Barrie Peter-
son's personal expenses direcdy. For exam-
ple. BOI transrerred at least S25,000 to Nancy 
Peterson at the direction or Barrie Peterson. 
BOI had no financial obligation to Nancy 
Peterson. Maryland Air also made payments, 
the indebtedness between the entities. 
None of these formalities is present. 
31. Barrie Peterson had no bank ac-
count in his name and, thus, had no means 
to pay his personal expenses directly. Ac-
cording to Barrie Peterson, whenever 
"money was available" from BHG, he 
would use the funds to pay for his personal 
expenses. 
32. In 1999, Barrie Peterson formed 
Birchwood Management, LLC 
("BMLLC"). This company (i) performs 
the same functions and uses the same peo-
ple, offices, and equipment as BHG, (ii) 
has no revenue source other than its 
charges to Peterson-related entities for ad-
ministrative and management services, and 
(iii) continues to pay Barrie Peterson's 
personal expenses. 
33. In sum, Barrie Peterson evaded his 
obligation to plaintiffs by directing that the 
entities he owned and controlled overpay 
the fee for BHG's administrative services, 
thereby commingling the money of First 
Flight and Maryland Air with BHG. Bar-
rie Peterson then directed that BHG pay 
his personal expenses with funds not su~ 
ject to plaintiffs' charging orders. 
V. Violation of Garnishment Orders 
and Intent to Avoid Payment of 
Judgments 
34. On or about March 18, 1999, C.F. 
Trust served garnishment summonses with 
respect to the CF Judgments on BHG, 
BOI, Maryland Air, and Maryland Air In-
ternational, Inc. ("International"). All 
four companies responded that "said gar-
nishee (Barrie Peterson) does not owe the 
at the direction or Barrie Peterson, on Barrie 
Peterson's home mortgage and transrerred 
approximately $36,000 to Nancy Peterson. 
Finally, First Flight made three direct pay-
ments or Barrie Peterson's personal expenses, 
which included, a payment or SI,SOO to Nan· 
cy Peterson in March 1996, and two mortgage 
payments totaling SS,SOO made in May 1996. 
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Defendants any sums of money, nor are 
the Defendants entiUed to receive any 
sums of money for the period covering said 
garnishment from this garnishee." See, 
e.g., C.F. Trust, l'IU!. v. Peterson, Answer, 
Civ. A. No. ~264-A, ~265-A (E.D. Va. 
June 14, 1999) (answer of Garnishee BOI). 
Nevertheless, BHG transferred $15,000 di-
recUy to Barrie Peterson on May 17, 1999. 
35. In Count V of the complaint in this 
matter, plaintiffs sought recovery of the 
$15,000 transferred in violation of the gar-
nishment order. The parties reached 
agreement that BHG would return this 
money, and accordingly, plaintiffs moved 
to dismiss Count V. While Count V has 
been dismissed, Barrie Peterson has nei-
ther returned the money to BHG nor paid 
it to C.F. Trust. 
36. Mter these garnishments were 
served, Barrie Peterson told his accoun-
tant that in the future, Scott Peterson was 
going to be advancing funds, particularly 
to Nancy Peterson, for payment of Barrie 
Peterson's personal expenses.16 
37. These facts, along with the exten-
sive and protracted history of litigation 
between these parties, convincingly dem-
onstrate that Barrie Peterson orchestrated 
a scheme to evade payment of his out-
standing obligations to plaintiffs, his judg-
ment creditors. While Barrie Peterson 
testified that he has never had any conver-
sations about devising mechanisms to 
avoid payment to his creditors, this testi-
mony is not credible. For example, Gayle 
WhiUock, Barrie Peterson's accountant, 
testified that Barrie Peterson stated, "I 
want to . . . make sure I don't pay Mr. 
Cooley (the owner of AUantic Funding) 
any money." Furthermore, Scott Peter-
son testified that "[m]y father and I often 
talked about the fact that my dad does not 
16. Nancy Peterson was responsible for paying 
the Petersons' household expenses every 
month with sums transferred by one or more 
of Barrie Peterson's entities. Until the gar-
want to pay them the judgments." Ac-
cordingly, despite Barrie Peterson's claim 
that he has not engaged in a scheme to 
evade payment to his creditors, the record, 
as a whole, clearly indicates that he intend-
ed to accomplish that precise end. He has 
not made any voluntary payments to his 
judgment creditors, and he has thus far 
largely succeeded in his scheme to frus-
trate plaintiffs' efforts to collect on their 
valid judgments. 
38. A review of the history of litigation 
between the parties sheds further light on 
the credibility of Barrie Peterson's testi-
mony in the instant case. These past 
cases resulted in two findings of fraudulent 
conveyances and three direct findings that 
Barrie Peterson had testified falsely. A 
particularly appropriate finding is in C.F. 
Trust, Inc. v. Peterson, Civil Action No. 
97-2003-A (E.D.Va. Jan. 8, 1999), where 
the district court found that 
Barrie Peterson, an acknowledged pro-
fessional litigant, has engaged in a pat-
tern of misstating the existence, value, 
number, and nature of his properties, 
other assets, and liabilities in various 
financial documents, legal filings, deposi-
tions, and conversations, many of these 
under oath ... [and that his defense at 
trial] was fabricated for this litigation. 
Furthermore, in another case, a Banlaupt-
cy court stated that 
To put the matter charitably, truth is 
not the brightest star in Mr. Peterson's 
constellation. 
C.F. Trust, l1U!. v. DEP, l'IU!., Adversary 
Proceeding No. 97-1017 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 
Oct. 31, 1997). These cases provide fur. 
ther support for the Court's finding that 
Barrie Peterson's testimony in this case 
was not credible, and therefore, that Bar-
nishment violations occurred, Barrie Peterson 
directed his accountant to deposit the needed 
funds from BHG, BOI, First Flight, or Mary· 
land Air into Nancy Peterson's account. 
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rie Peterson took all available steps to 
evade payment of his obligations to plain· 
tiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. Jurisdiction and Venue 
39. This Court has subject matter jur-
isdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 
which confers original jurisdiction for civil 
actions between citizens of different states 
and involving an amount in controversy 
exceeding $75,000. 
40. Venue is proper in the Eastern 
District of Vll'ginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391 as all defendants reside within the 
State ofVll'ginia. 
ll. Res Judicata Effect on Maryland 
Air Industries 
[1] 41. In C.F. Trust, l1U! v. Peter· 
scm, Civil Action No. 97-2003-A (E.D. Va. 
Jan 8, 1999), appeal pending, sub nom., 
C.F. Trust, l'IU! v. Jubal, l1U!, Case Nos. 
99-1197, 99-1198, 99-1199 (consolidated) 
(4th Cir.1999), a district court found that 
Maryland Air is the alter ego of Barrie 
Peterson. Principles of res judicata man· 
date that this ruling be applied in the 
instant matter. See infra 11 42. 
[2, 3] 42. As a threshold matter, fed-
eral, rather than state, law regarding res 
judicata governs the outcome of this ease. 
This question is significant because federal 
and state law treat differently the preclu-
sive effect of a judgment pending appeal. 
While state law certainly controls the 
rights and duties of the parties in a federal 
action founded upon diversity of citizen-
ship, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), 
"[t]ederallaw determines the effects under 
the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a 
federal court." Restatement (Second} of 
Judgments § 87 (1982). The Fourth Cir· 
euit has recognized that "whether a federal 
court sits in diversity or has some other 
basis of jurisdiction, questions of the effect 
and scope of its judgment involve the pow-
er of the federal tribunal itself, and are not 
varied merely because state rules of deci-
sion underlie the judgment." Harnett v. 
BiUman, BOO F .2d 1308, 1312 (4th Cir. 
1986); see also Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Co. v. International Market Place. 773 
F .2d 1068, 1069 (9th Cir.1985); Precision 
Air Parts, l1U! v. Aveo Cmp., 736 F .2d 
1499, 1503 (11th Cir.1984); Hunt v. Liber-
ty Lobby, 11U!, 707 F .2d 1493, 1497 
(D.C.Cir.1983}. Any other result would 
"consign the effect of federal judgments to 
the uncertainties of state law in whatever 
jurisdiction a subsequent suit happened to 
be brought." Shoup v. Bell & HoweU Co., 
872 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (4th Cir.1989). Ae· 
eordingly, federal principles of res judicata 
must control. Under these rules, three 
factors must be established to give a prior 
ruling preclusive effect: (i) an identity of 
cause of action between both suits; (ii) 
final judgment on the merits in the prior 
suit; and (iii) an identity of parties or their 
privies in the two suits. See Meekins v. 
United Transp. Union, 946 F .2d 1054, 
1057 (4th Cir.1991). There is no dispute 
as to the first prong. Second, given the 
application of federal law, it is also settled 
that the judgment in the previous action is 
final. The established rule in the federal 
courts is that a final judgment retains all 
of its preclusive effect pending appeal. 
See Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 
898 (4th Cir.1992); SSIH Equipment S .A 
v. United States Int'l Trade Commln, 718 
F.2d 365, 370 (Fed.Cir.1983) (noting that 
final judgment retains all of its res judica-
ta consequences pending decision of the 
appeal); 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure, § 4433, at 
308 (1981). Finally, the third prong of the 
res judicata analysis is satisfied because 
there exists an identity of parties or their 
privies in the two suits. While Maryland 
Air ·was not a party to the previous action, 
Barrie Peterson, Maryland Air's president 
and sole shareholder, was. It is settled 
A-76 
642 140 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES 
that a president of a corporation satisfies 
the privity requirement. See Levine v. 
McLeskey, 881 F.Supp. 1030, 1055 
(E.D.Va.1995) (noting the privies include 
the president, chief executive officer, and a 
50% shareholder of a corporation). Ac-
cordingly, the decision in C.F. Trust v. 
Peterson, Civil Action No. 97-2003-A, that 
Maryland Air is the alter ego of Barrie 
Peterson is binding in this matter. 
UI. Reverse Piercing Against 
First Flight 
[ 4] 43. In CF. Trust v. First Flight 
Limited Pa:rtnership, 111 F.Supp.2d 734 
(E.D.Va.2000), the "reverse piercing of the 
corporate veil" doctrine was recognized 
under the law of the state of Vll'ginia. 
This doctrine was also found to be applica-
ble to limited partnerships as well as cor-
porations.17 
[5] 44. The reverse piercing of the 
corporate veil doctrine is not itself an inde-
pendent cause of action; rather it estab-
lishes a means of imposing liability on an 
underlying cause of action. See Peacock v. 
Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 353-54, 116 S.Ct. 
862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996); Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Venners, 165 F.3d 
912, 1998 WL 761505 at *1-2 (4th Cir. 
1998); Fuulity NaL Title Ins. Co. v. Boz-
zuto, 227 B.R 466, 471 n. 8 (E.D.Va.1998). 
Defendants contend that the sole remain-
ing cause of action in this case-the one 
seeking to pierce the veil in reverse-is 
insufficient to support jurisdiction over 
this proceeding. This argument fails, how-
ever, because plaintiffs' complaint does 
contain an underlying cause of action, that 
is, a cause of action to collect on the un-
paid judgments owed by Barrie Peterson 
to C.F. Trust and Atlantic Funding. 
[6] 45. The Supreme Court of Virgi-
nia has not squarely addressed the issue of 
17. See First Flight, 111 F.Supp.2d at 740 & n. 
II ("In a reverse piercing action . . . • the 
plaintiff seeks to reach the assets of a corpo-
whether a judgment creditor can pierce 
the corporate veil based on a cause of 
action to collect on an unpaid debt. 
Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 594, 
499 S.E.2d 266 (1998), however, indicates 
that if presented with these facts, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia would permit the 
action to proceed. In Greenberg, the Com-
monwealth tiled a separate action against 
Greenberg after the Commonwealth had 
obtained a judgment against him. The 
Supreme Court of V1rginia dismissed the 
action, not because Vll'ginia law did not 
permit piercing of the veil based on a 
collection action, but rather because the 
facts did not show that defendant had a 
sufficient unity of interest and control with 
the corporation. See id. at 603-{)5, 499 
S.E.2d 266; see also Steyr-Daimler-Ptu:h 
of America CO'rp. v. Pappas, 852 F.2d 132 
(4th Cir.1998) (permitting piercing of the 
corporate veil claim to collect on outstand-
ing judgment). Moreover, permitting this 
action to proceed is justified by principles 
of fairness and equity. This is so because 
if the law did not permit plaintiffs to sue to 
collect on their underlying judgments in 
these circumstances, judgment debtors 
would be provided a roadmap on how to 
avoid payment of their outstanding obli-
gations. Put differently, judgment debt-
ors, like Barrie Peterson, could use their 
corporations and partnerships to pay their 
personal expenses with funds beyond the 
reach of charging orders, thereby forever 
avoiding their obligations to judgment 
creditors. This is an untenable result the 
law should not allow. Accordingly, plain-
tiffs can maintain their action to pierce the 
veil of First Flight in reverse based on the 
underlying cause of action to collect on the 
judgments held by C.F. Trust and Atlantic 
Funding. 
ration to satisfy claims against a corporate 
insider."). 
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[7, 8] 46. "(T]he standard for piercing 
the corporate veil . . . has occasioned much 
litigation, perhaps because, as the Su-
preme Court of Vll"ginia has stated 'no 
single rule or criterion . . . can be applied 
to determine whether piercing the corpo-
rate veil is justified.' " First Flight, Ill 
F.Supp.2d at 741 (quoting O'Hazza 11. 
Exec. Credit Corp., 246 Va. 111, 115, 431 
S.E.2d 318 (1993)). Rather than a precise 
formula, the veil piercing determination 
requires a "fact-specific inquiry into the 
circumstances surrounding the corpora-
tion, the related parties, and the acts in 
question.'' First Fligk4 111 F .Supp.2d at 
741. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of 
Vll"ginia has cautioned that piercing the 
corporate veil is justified only under excep-
tional circumstances, which occur (i) when 
the "unity of interest and ownership is 
such that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer 
exist and to adhere to that separateness 
would work an injustice," and (ii) when the 
shareholder has "used the corporation to 
evade a personal obligation, to perpetrate 
fraud or a crime, to commit an injustice, or 
to gain an unfair advantage .... " O'Haz-
za, 246 Va. at 115,431 S.E.2d 318; see also 
Ckeatle 11. Rudel's Swimming Pool Supply 
Co., Inc., 234 Va. 207, 212, 360 S.E.2d 828 
(1987). Because Barrie Peterson used the 
entities he owns and controls as part of his 
scheme to evade payment of plaintiffs' 
judgments, an action to pierce the veil in 
reverse is justified by the facts of the case 
at bar. 
47. As noted, the veil-piercing analysis 
properly begins with a showing of a unity 
of interest and control between an individ-
ual owner or shareholder and the corpora-
tion or partnership. While no single factor 
is determinative, the Supreme Court of 
Vll"ginia has identified a number of factors 
that when viewed in the totality of the 
circumstances may suggest a unity of in-
terest and control. Specifically, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has focused on (i) 
whether personal and business assets were 
commingled, (ii) whether the individual "si-
phoned [business] assets into their own 
pockets," (iii) whether the business entity 
was undercapitalized, or (iv) whether busi-
ness formalities were observed. Ckeatle, 
234 Va. at 212, 360 S.E.2d 828; see also 
Greenberg, 255 Va. at 604-05, 499 S.E.2d 
266; O'Hazza, 246 Va. at 115, 431 S.E.2d 
318; Lewis, 207 Va. at 31, 147 S.E.2d 747. 
The record facts of this case confirm that 
factors (i), (ii), and (iv) are present here. 
48. It is not enough, though, that these 
factors are present. Piercing of the corpo-
rate veil in reverse is appropriate only if 
Barrie Peterson used his control over 
First Flight to evade a personal obligation. 
Specifically, piercing will be denied if a 
valid business purpose is served by the 
conduct at issue. For example, in O'Haz-
za, the Supreme Court of Vll'ginia refused 
to pierce the corporate veil because the 
financial support that defendants provided 
to their son through a monthly loan from 
the corporation and the tax consequences 
from a subchapter S election did not sug-
gest any impropriety. See O'Hazza, 246 
Va. at 118, 431 S.E.2d 318. The Supreme 
Court of Vll"ginia found that these actions 
were "common and legitimate." /d. Like-
wise, in Ckeatle, the Supreme Court of 
Vll"ginia refused to pierce the corporate 
veil because there was no evidence (i) that 
there was commingling of personal and 
business assets, (ii) that business assets 
were siphoned away for personal use, (iii) 
that corporate formalities were ignored, or 
(iv) that a valid business purpose for the 
transactions was lacking. See Cheatle, 234 
Va. at 213, 360 S.E.2d 828. Similarly, in 
Greenberg, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
upheld a lower court's decision not to 
pierce the corporate veil because the 
shareholder had not used the corporate 
structure to evade obligations or to perpe-
trate a fraud; instead, the Supreme Court 
found that his actions were justified by 
valid business reasons. See Greenberg, 
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255 Va. at 60~5, 499 S.E.2d 266 (finding 
that the manner in which defendant re-
couped his loan to corporation was justi-
fied by corporation's inability to abide by 
its agreement to repay the loan within the 
period specified in the loan agreement). 
49. These principles applied here com-
pel the conclusion that First Flight is the 
alter ego of Barrie Peterson and that, ac-
cordingly, an action to pierce the veil in 
reverse is appropriate. The facts of the 
case at bar reflect both that the unity of 
interest is such that the "separate person-
alities of [First Flight and Barrie Peter-
son] no longer exist," O'Hazza, 246 Va. at 
115, 431 S.E.2d 318, and that Barrie Peter-
son used this control to evade his obli-
gations to his creditors. In this regard, 
Barrie Peterson maintained control over 
First Flight and its distributions-despite 
the official transfer of control and owner-
ship of First Flight to Scott Peterson,l8 
commingled his personal funds with the 
funds of the entities that he controlled and 
owned,19 siphoned business assets for his 
personal use,20 and caused First Flight to 
ignore the requirements of its partnership 
agreement. 21 Given this control and unity 
of interest with First Flight, Barrie Peter-
son was able to evade his obligation to his 
creditors by directing the transfer of mil-
lions of dollars out of First Flight to Scott 
18. See supra 'I'll' 15-19. 
19. See supra'' 25-30. 
20. Seeid. 
21. See supra 'l!'i 20-24, 27(C) n. 14 
22. See supra t 6 for a discussion of First 
Flight's operation of Top Flight Airpark. In 
addition, First Flight had gross rental reve-
nues of approximately $2.8 million annually. 
It reponed net income of $270,789 in 1996, a 
loss of $246,624 in 1997, and net income of 
$646.947 in 1998. 
23. In Lewis Trucking Corp. v. Commonwealth, 
207 Va. 23, 147 S.E.2d 747 (1966), the Su-
Peterson and to BHG for the payment of 
his personal expenses. 
50. Defendants argue that these facts 
are insufficient to justify an action to 
pierce the corporate veil in reverse be-
cause First Flight is not a sham or paper 
entity. 22 This argument fails, because 
while operating as a sham entity might 
ipso facto establish the grounds for pierc-
ing the corporate veil, it is not the sole 
means.23 Instead, as noted, the appropri-
ate inquiry is whether the conduct in ques-
tion was supported by a legitimate busi-
ness purpose. 
51. In the case at bar, no legitimate 
business purpose supports the $4.3 million 
distribution to Scott Peterson and the 
transfer of funds above the cost allocation 
to BHG. Indeed, the record reflects that 
these transfers were part of Barrie Peter-
son's scheme to avoid plaintiffs' judgments 
and charging orders by having his person-
al expenses paid with funds from entities 
he owns and controls.zc None of the de-
fense witnesses could provide a legitimate 
justification for the overpayment of the 
cost allocation formula. Instead, the rec-
ord convincingly reflects that Barrie Pe-
terson directed payments from First 
Flight and Maryland Air to BHG whenev-
er funds were needed to pay his personal 
expenses. 25 
preme Coun of Virginia held that a transfer 
of assets to a paper corporation was "merely 
a device or sham to hide his ownership." I d. 
at 31, 147 S.E.2d 747. In no case following 
Lewis Trucking has the Supreme Coun of 
Virginia required that an entity have no val-
ue-that is. a paper corporation-as a prereq-
uisite for an action to pierce the corporate 
veil. 
24. See supra ,, 25-30. 
25. See supra '!! 24. Significantly, the largest 
personal expense paid on Barrie Peterson's 
behalf by BHG and BOI was his legal ex-
penses to fight C.F. Trust and AFC from col-
lecting on their judgmencs. 
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52. In sum, plaintiffs have conclusively 
established the grounds necessary to sup-
port piercing the corporate veil in reverse. 
Barrie Peterson "treated his corporate and 
personal affairs as if they were indistin-
guishable," Cancun Adventure Tours, Inc. 
v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 F .2d 
1044, 1048 (4th Cir.1988), by directing the 
affairs of First Flight, Maryland Air, 
BHG, and BOI to ensure that he received 
the funds he needed to pay for his person-
al expenses and that the remainder was 
passed on to his son through distributions 
from First Flight. This scheme enabled 
Barrie Peterson to accomplish his ex-
pressed desire to avoid payment to plain-
tiffs, his legitimate judgment creditors. 
IV. Remedies 
53. Plaintiffs seek three forms of relief 
in this matter: (i) an order declaring First 
Flight and Maryland Air to be the alter 
egos of Barrie Peterson and thus that the 
assets of these entities are subject to the 
CF Judgment and the AFC Judgment; (ii) 
a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
transfer or disposition of any assets of 
Barrie Peterson, or the transfer or disposi-
tion of any assets or ownership interests in 
First Flight and Maryland Air, except as 
may be necessary in the ordinary course of 
business. Plaintiffs further request that 
any transfers permitted under this injunc-
tion cannot be made to or for the benefit of 
Barrie or Nancy Peterson, except pay-
ments to C.F. Trust or Atlantic Funding to 
satisfy the outstanding judgments; and 
(iii) appointment of a receiver(s) to admin-
ister the business and affairs of Barrie 
Peterson, First Flight, and Maryland Air. 
54. Because plaintiffs have proven the 
grounds necessary to pierce the veil in 
reverse of First Flight and Maryland Air, 
plaintiffs are entitled to an order declaring 
that First Flight and Maryland Air are the 
alter egos of Barrie Peterson and that 
their assets are subject to the CF Judg-
ment and the AFC Judgment. 
55. Plaintiffs' request for a restitution-
ary award from First Flight must be de-
nied. Even assuming the power to order 
such a remedy, see SSDS, Inc. v. Mayor, 
215 F.3d 1321 (4th Cir. June 5, 2000); 66 
Arn.Jur .2d Restitution and Implied Con-
tracts §§ 3,4, First Flight is not a suitable 
candidate; it has not been unjustly en-
riched and therefore is not itself profiting 
from the improper distributions to Scott 
Peterson and indirectly to Barrie Peter-
son. Moreover, the effect of the declara-
tion that First Flight and Maryland Air 
are the alter egos of Barrie Peterson is 
that plaintiffs, as judgment creditors, can 
now seek satisfaction of their judgments 
from the assets of First Flight and Mary-
land Air as well as from those of Barrie 
Peterson. Accordingly, an award of resti-
tution would be redundant and of little 
utility to plaintiffs. 
56. If Barrie Peterson continues to 
abuse First Flight and Maryland Air to 
evade his obligation to his judgment credi-
tors, plaintiffs can return to Court to seek 
further injunctive relief. 
[9-11] 57. Plaintiffs request for the 
appointment of a receiver must be denied. 
A court's power to appoint a receiver 
should "be exercised with caution and only 
in a strong case." Betkleluml, Steel Corp. 
v. WiUiams Indus., Inc., 245 Va. 38, 425 
S.E.2d 484 (1993). Therefore, a court of 
equity is not empowered to appoint a re-
ceiver for a corporation, "absent proof of 
insolvency, fraud, waste, or improper con-
duct." Adelman Assoc. v. Goldsten, 209 
Va. 731, 738, 167 S.E.2d 104 (1969). Here, 
the record does not reflect that First 
Flight or Maryland Air is insolvent. 
Moreover, while plaintiffs have successful-
ly proven that these entities are the alter 
egos of Barrie Peterson and that he has 
used these entities to evade his personal 
obligations, these facts are insufficient to 
justify the appointment of a receiver. This 
is so because under Virginia law, the ap-
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pointment of a receiver is generally for the 
purpose of overseeing the liquidation or 
dissolution of an entity. While exceptions 
to this rule exist, these exceptions are 
limited to factual circumstances not pres-
ent here. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange 
Commission v. Bowler, 427 F .2d 190 (4th 
Cir.1970) (appointment of receiver is nec-
essary to protect public interest where 
corporation has violated provisions of fed-
eral securities laws). Accordingly, plain-
tiffs' demand for appointment of a receiver 
must be denied. 
58. Plaintiffs also request attorney's 
fees and costs. This request will be post-
poned pending resolution of any appeal of 
this matter. If no appeal is taken, or after 
disposition of any appeal, if appropriate, a 
schedule will be established for the sub-
mission of a fee petition and further brief-





IZATION SERVICE, et al., 
Respondents. 
No. CIV. A. 2:01CV171. 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Virginia, 
Norfolk Division. 
April 18, 2001. 
Alien filed petition for a writ of habe-
as corpus, requesting a stay of deportation 
while she seeks discretionary relief from 
removal. The District Court, Friedman, J., 
held that: (1) notice of the deadline for 
alien's voluntary departure was sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of Due Pro-
cess; (2) failure to issue warnings regard-
ing consequences of remaining in the Unit-
ed States after scheduled date of voluntary 
departure did not constitute a deprivation 
of some constitutional or statutory right 
such that a stay of removal would be justi-
fied to permit alien to benefit from the 
right; (3) alien had a statutory right to 
petition Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to reopen her asylum appli-
cation based upon changed country condi-
tions; and (4) alien was entitled to habeas 
relief staying her removal until such time 
as her qualification under Legal Immigra-
tion Family Equity Act (LIFE Act), and 
application for adjustment to her immigra-
tion status was decided. 
Petition granted. 
1. Habeas Corpus ~21 
illegal Immigration Refonn and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act's (IIRIRA) re-
strictions on judicial review did not deprive 
district court of jurisdiction over habeas 
petition of alien requesting a stay of depor-
tation while she sought discretionary relief 
from removal. Immigration and National-
ity Act, § 242(g), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1252(g); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241. 
2. Habeas Corpus e:>257 
Alien subject to final deportation or-
der was "in custody" for habeas corpus 
purposes even if she was not literally in 
the physical custody of the United States. 
28 U.S.C.A. § 2241. 
See publication Words and Phras· 
es for other judicial constructions 
and definitions. 
3. Aliens e:>53.10(1) 
Because voluntary departure is prem-
ised on an alien's being able and willing to 
promptly depart the United States, an Im-
migration Judge may not grant voluntary 
departure for an indefinite period of time. 
4. Aliens e:>54(1) 
An alien does not have any constitu-
tional or statutory right to be provided 
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Civil Action No. 99-1742-A 
ORDER 
The matter came before the Court on motions by both parties to alter or amend the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on March 22,2001. See C.F. TntSt, Inc. v. First 
Flight Ltd. Partnership, C.A. No. 99-1742-A (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2001). 
Because these matters have been adequately addressed on the papers, oral argument is not 
necessary and would not aid in the decisional process. 
For these reasons, 
It is ORDERED that the motions to alter or amend the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Modifications were made to '11~ 12, 
16, 20, 21, and 24 of the findings of fact. Significantly, these modifications do not alter the 
judgment in the Memorandum Opinion. The modified paragraphs are as follows: 
12. Carnett Commercial Investors, Inc., ("Carnett") is owned by Scott Peterson. Carnett 
holds a judgment against Barrie Peterson, individually and as Trustee, in the principal amount of 
S1,710,909.67. This judgment was entered by the Prince William County Circuit Court on July 
30, 1993. On August 10, 1993, Carnett obtained a charging order on its judgment from the 
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Prince William County Circuit Court against Barrie Peterson's partnership interest in First Flight. 
To the extent that the Carnett judgment against Barrie Peterson remains valid, it is in a priority 
position superior to the judgments held by C.F. Trust and Atlantic Funding. 
16. Upland paid only a nominal fee to become First Flight's General Partner. At the time 
Upland became First Flight's general partner, First Flight was in bankruptcy and had defaulted on 
a loan of approximately $12-13 million, secured by Barrie Peterson. In March 1996, First Flight 
received a loan of $6.5 million from Allied Capital Commercial Corporation ("Allied") from a 
refinancing of the Top Flight Airpark ("Allied Loan"). First Flight used the proceeds of this loan 
to settle the prior debt at a deep discount for First Flight and Barrie Peterson. The proceeds of 
the Allied Loan were also used to relieve Barrie Peterson of$3,275,536 of personal liability to 
UBS Securities. In 1997, First Flight obtained a $10 million loan, a portion of which was used to 
pay off the Allied Loan. 
20. The more than S4 million in distributions to Scott Peterson, made chiefly from the 
proceeds of the 1997 S 10 million loan, contravened the requirements of the First Flight 
partnership agreement and therefore conclusively establish that First Flight and Upland failed to 
follow the requisite business and corporate formalities. Defendants mistakenly contend that 
Sections 12.5 and 12.6 of First Flight's partnership agreement permitted the distribution of over 
S4 million to Scott Peterson while distributing nothing to Barrie Peterson.8 This argument fails 
8First Flight's partnership agreement provided that "Cash from Operations ... shall be 
distributed 98% to the Limited Partners on a Pro Rata Basis" and that "Cash from Financings 
[after repayments of the refinanced debt, establishment of reserves and repayment of capital 
contributions] will be distributed ... first, to the Limited Partners on a Pro Rata Basis." First 
Flight Partnership Agreement§§ 12.5, 12.6. Furthermore, the agreement defines "Pro Rata 
Basis" as "an allocation or distribution to the Limited Partners in proportion to their respective 
Capital Contributions." !d. § 7.22. 
2 
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because even assuming funds were available for distribution after repayment of the Allied Loan 
from the proceeds of the 1997 refinancing of the Top Flight Airpark, Scott Peterson was still not 
entitled to distributions under Section 7.22 of the Partnership Agreement because his capital 
account never showed a positive balance. 
21. Scott Peterson made capital contributions to First Flight in small amounts only after 
he distributed to himself the $4.3 million. Taking into account the result of the contributions he 
made to First Flight and the distributions that were made to him, Scott Peterson's capital account 
with First Flight showed a negative balance ofS3.17 million by the end of 1999. Moreover, to 
the extent that Scott Peterson's capital account was greater than Barrie Peterson's, this was only a 
result of the fact that when Barrie Peterson transferred 49% of the limited partnership to Scott 
Peterson for little or no consideration, he did not also transfer a corresponding share of his 
existing negative capital balance. Had he done so, Scott Peterson's capital account would have 
been less than Barrie Peterson's. Accordingly, distributions should have been made in 
proportion to each limited partner's respective ownership interests. 
24. The improper S4.3 million distribution to Scott Peterson had two primary effects. 
First, had the distribution been properly paid to the limited partners pro rata, as required, 
approximately $2 million would have been distributed to Barrie Peterson, and this amount would 
then have been subject to collection by plaintiffs through the operation of their valid charging 
orders. Second, the improper distribution provided Scott Peterson with funds he could transfer to 
BHG, which could then pay Barrie Peterson's personal expenses with funds beyond the reach of 
plaintiffs' charging orders. Scott Peterson did precisely this, transferring approximately 
3 
A-84 
S687 ,000 to BHG, ultimately to be used to pay Barrie Peterson's personal expenses. 11 Also, 
Scott Peterson used a portion of the $4.3 million distribution to funnel funds back to First Flight 
to ensure its solvency after First Flight had made substantial overpayments to BHG to pay Barrie 
Peterson's personal expenses. See infra Part IV. 
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order and the accompanying r 
Opinion to all counsel of record. 
Alexandria, Virginia 
April26,2001 
T. r , 
tates District Judge 
11Scott Peterson and Barrie Peterson's testimony was contradictory as to the purpose and 
nature of the $687,000 payments to BHG. Scott Peterson testified that he was repaying loans that 
were made directly from his father; while Barrie Peterson testified that Scott Peterson was 
repaying loans made from Barrie Peterson-controlled entities. More significantly, though, there 
is no proof, other than the Petersons' testimony, that these loans were ever made. Because the 
testimony of both Barrie and Scott Peterson, in this case, was not credible, there is no basis to 
conclude that these distributions and overpayments to BHG and BOI were anything other than an 
attempt to evade Barrie Peterson's personal obligations to the judgment creditors. 
4 
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